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SOMMAIRE
Différentiels de fécondité entre les femmes juives d’Israël
et de la Cisjordanie
Israël est l’un des pays développés les plus féconds dans le monde et main-
tient un taux de fécondité stable depuis 1995. Il a échappé à la chute spectac-
ulaire de la fécondité qui a été observée dans la plupart des pays occidentaux.
Le taux de fécondité était de 2,96 enfants par femme en 2009 (Statistical Ab-
stract of Israel, 2010, tableau 3.14). Le maintien d’une si forte fécondité pourrait
être dû à l’immigration et à la “guerre démographique” qui sévit entre les dif-
férentes communautés vivant dans le pays (Sardon, 2006). Toutefois, on observe
une diﬀérence signiﬁcative entre les niveaux de fécondité des juifs d’Israël et de
Cisjordanie depuis plusieurs années. Les études qui portent sur la fécondité en
Israël sont faites au niveau national, ce qui ne fournit aucune explication sur cette
diﬀérence. Pour ces raisons, l’étude de la fécondité en Israël mérite une attention
particulière.
Ce projet vise à identiﬁer les diﬀérents facteurs qui ont une incidence sur la fé-
condité des femmes juives vivant en Israël et en Cisjordanie. Il contribuera à une
meilleure compréhension des comportements liés à la fécondité de la population
juive de la Cisjordanie et peut fournir des indices sur les mécanismes complexes
qui régissent les relations entre Juifs et Arabes dans les territoires occupés.
Grâce aux données recueillies dans l’Enquête sociale générale de 2004 d’Israël,
iv
des analyses descriptives et explicatives ont été produites. Dans un premier
temps, les facteurs qui ont un impact sur la fécondité dans chaque région ont
été déterminés et par la suite, une analyse de l’importance de ces facteur sur la
fécondité a été produite. Le nombre d’enfants nés de femmes âgées de 20 à 55
ans constitue la variable d’intérêt et les variables explicatives retenues sont les
suivantes: religiosité, éducation, revenu familial mensuel, statut d’emploi, pays
d’origine, âge et état matrimonial.
Cette étude a montré que les femmes juives qui résident en Cisjordanie ont un
nombre prévu d’enfants de 13% supérieur à celui des femmes juives qui résident
en Israël lorsque l’on contrôle toutes les variables. Il est notamment montré
que la religion joue un rôle important dans l’explication de la forte fécondité des
femmes juives dans les deux régions, mais son impact est plus important en Israël.
L’éducation joue également un rôle important dans la réduction du nombre prévu
d’enfants, en particulier en Cisjordanie. Tous ces facteurs contribuent à expliquer
les diﬀérents niveaux de fécondité dans les deux régions, mais l’étude montre que
ces facteurs ne permettent pas une explication exhaustive de la forte fécondité
en Israël et en Cisjordanie. D’autres forces qui ne sont pas mesurables doivent
avoir une incidence sur la fécondité telles que le nationalisme ou la laïcisation,
par exemple.
Mots clés: Diﬀérentiels de fécondité, Israël, Cisjordanie, Variables socio-économiques,
Variables démographiques, Religiosité, Nombre d’enfants nés, Régression de Pois-
son
vSUMMARY
Fertility Differentials of Jewish Women Living in Israel
and the West Bank
Israel is one of the most fertile developed countries in the world and has had
a stable fertility rate since 1995. The country avoided the dramatic fall in fer-
tility that has been observed in most Western countries. The fertility rate was
of 2.96 children per woman in 2009 (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2010, table
3.14). Maintaining such a high fertility level could be due to immigration and
the “demographic war” between the diﬀerent communities living in the country
(Sardon, 2006). However, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the levels of fertility of
the jewish population of Israel and the West Bank has been observed for several
years. In the literature, studies of fertility in Israel are conducted at a national
level, which neither reveals nor explains the diﬀerence. Accordingly, Israel’s high
fertility deserves a particular attention.
This project aims to identify the diﬀerent factors that aﬀect the fertility of Jew-
ish women living in Israel and in the West Bank. It will contribute to a better
understanding of the fertility behavior of the Jewish population of the West Bank
and may shed light on the complex mechanisms that govern the relations between
Jews and Arabs in the Occupied Territories.
With data collected in the General Social Survey of Israel of 2004, descriptive
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and explanatory analyses were produced. In the ﬁrst part, factors inﬂuencing fer-
tility in each region have been determined and an analysis of the importance of
each factor on fertility was conducted in the second part. The outcome of interest
is the number of children ever born to women aged 20 to 55 and the independent
variables are: religiosity, education, monthly family income, employment status,
country of origin, age and marital status.
This study showed that Jewish women residing in the West Bank have an ex-
pected number of children 13% higher than their counterparts residing in Israel.
It is also shown that the intensity of religious interest plays an important role
in explaining the high fertility of Jewish women in both regions but its impact
is more important in Israel. Education also plays an important role in reducing
the expected number of children, especially in the West Bank. All of these fac-
tors contribute to explaining the diﬀerent fertility levels in the two regions but
the study shows that these factors do not provide an exhaustive explanation of
higher fertility in the West Bank. There must be other forces that have an impact
on fertility but which are not measurable such as nationalism or secularization,
for example.
Keywords: Fertility, Israel, West Bank, Socioeconomic variables, Demographic
variables, Religiosity, Number of children ever born, Poisson regression
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INTRODUCTION
At ﬁrst sight, studying the fertility behavior of Jewish women in Israel and the
West Bank can seem odd considering the fact that the whole population of the
country is of 7.3 million inhabitants (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2010, table
2.1) which is less than one percent of the world population. However, it has been
noted that this small population is unique in terms of its demography, e.g., Far-
gues (2000) and Anson and Meir (1996).
It is the most fertile developed country in the world (Sardon, 2006). The country
has managed to keep its fertility levels relatively high all throughout its history
while most of the other developed countries in the world were experiencing an
often drastic fertility transition. The total fertility rate of the population of Is-
rael was of 3.85 children per woman in 1960-1964 and decreased to 2.96 children
per woman in 2008 (Statistical Abstract of Israel, table 3.13). In contrast, the
total fertility rates of other developed countries show a general trend of fertility
decrease during the past decades. The TFR in Western European countries was
2.7 children per woman in 1960-1965 and decreased to 1.5 children per woman
in 1995-2000 (Guengant, 2002). In the neighboring countries (Western Asia), the
fertility transition is even more obvious: from a higher level of 6.2 children per
woman in 1960-1965 to 3.9 children per woman in 1995-2000 (Guengant, 2002).
In Israel, the change has been of lesser importance and the fertility level was
maintained higher than in other developed countries. Over the same time period,
fertility decined by only 3.85 to 2.93 children per woman (Statistical Abstract of
Israel, 2009, table 3.13). It is clear that Israeli fertility diﬀers from that of most
3other developed countries in the world and deserves to be studied more exten-
sively.
Looking further into the data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics of
Israel, these data show that the high level of fertility of the country is not evenly
distributed among the population. There are diﬀerent levels of fertility among
the Jews, the Christians and the Arabs but in this mémoire, we focus on the Jews.
One important characteristic that seems to have an impact on fertility and that is
not mentioned above is region of residence. Kesarwani (1989) mentioned that it
was diﬃcult to determine a single fertility pattern for Israel as a whole because of
possible regional diﬀerences in fertility. According to Kesarwani (1989), human
fertility is essentially related to environment and culture which are not uniform
in all the regions. Indeed, the Jews living in the West Bank clearly have a higher
fertility than their counterparts in the rest of Israel. The data from the General
Social Survey (GSS) of Israel of 2004 shows that Jewish women living in the West
Bank had an average number of children of 2.84. When looking at Israel without
the West Bank, this number drops to 1.88. The next table presents the basic
statistics for the mean number of children per Jewish woman in both regions.
Table 0.1. Mean number of children ever born per Jewish woman
in Israel and the West Bank, standard deviation and number of
observations
Region Mean CEB Std. Dev. N
Israel 1.88 1.71 2,099
West Bank 2.84 1.98 90
Source: General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
Most demographic research on fertility is conducted at national level for practical
and ideological reasons. The state collects data on the population on a national
level and the population is conceived as a national body (Fargues, 2000). There
4is no research available which explains fertility diﬀerences between Israel and the
West Bank. This mémoire addresses this key question, deﬁning which variables
are associated with the fertility of Jewish women living in Israel and the West
Bank and exploring whether these variables have the same association on both
regions.
The literature on fertility diﬀerentials is substantial. A number of studies have
extensively used a series of socio-economic and demographic variables to explain
the diﬀerences. Therefore, it is possible to have an idea of which variables will
signiﬁcantly aﬀect fertility. However one variable could be very useful in this
kind of study but which has been neglected over the years is religiosity. Indeed,
as Zhang (2008) mentions: “The eﬀect of religiosity on fertility appears to have
eluded researchers.”
Many researchers have used religion as a variable in their studies on fertility
diﬀerentials. However these studies have focused on fertility diﬀerentials among
various religious denominations but not between individuals of the same religious
group. In the present study, religiosity, as opposed to religion will be added to
our explanatory paradigm as an explicative variable of fertility among people
belonging to the same religious group. It has been shown that religious partici-
pation inﬂuences people’s demographic behavior (Zhang, 2008) and it is known
that religion and religiosity are at the heart of the creation of the Jewish state
and the cause of many of the wars that the country has been through during its
short existence.
As a matter of fact, the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict cannot be ignored as it has
often been called “the war of the cradles” (Courbage, 1999). Courbage (1999)
stipulates that the political future of Jews and Palestinians, for now and for the
foreseeable future, will be determined by decisions taken within the family, de-
cisions about having or not having a child, advancing or delaying a birth. From
this comment, it appears clear that demography and more precisely, fertility has
5a major role in the political arena of the country in maintaining or improving the
relative population weight of Israel versus Palestine. Fargues (2000) also men-
tioned the particularity of fertility in Israel/Palestine:
“(. . . ) the exceptional political history of these populations, in
which demography played a major role for both sides in nation-
building, sheds a particular light on the political dimension of fer-
tility change, a matter of interest beyond the limits of this small
piece of land.”
All this information demonstrates the importance of fertility change as a political
issue. Religiosity and not just religion is a key factor in the evolution of fertility
and population in Israel and Palestine. Considering the role of religiosity among
the other socio-economic and demographic variables in a study on fertility diﬀer-
entials of Jewish women in Israel is of major importance.
There are additional reasons why a study of the high fertility of Israel and of
the Occupied territories is important and needs to be conducted. A better un-
derstanding of the diﬀerences between the fertility patterns of the Jews living in
Israel and those living in the Occupied Territories is important. They could be
explained by many factors including the socioeconomic conditions of people living
in both regions, political views and ideologies. Having a better understanding of
their behavior and knowing which factor inﬂuences their fertility the most could
not only help understanding the mechanisms of Jewish fertility but could also
shed the light on the much more complex relationship of the Jews and the Arabs
in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
The ultimate relevance of this study is its political contribution to knowledge.
The political situation and the living conditions in the Occupied Territories are
major preoccupations of the International Community. Their lack of information
6on these people prevents them from providing adequate support. The Israeli gov-
ernment is being urged to stop the construction of settlements in the West Bank
as it would be the starting point toward a Peace treaty and lead to the creation
of a Palestinian state. The Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres once said in an
interview with Morgan Spurlock1:
“What is a Jewish state? It’s not a religious deﬁnition; it’s a demo-
graphic deﬁnition. If the Jews will not be the majority we won’t
have a Jewish state.”
The Israeli government refuses to freeze the construction of new Jewish settle-
ments in the Occupied Territories justifying its decision with the speciﬁc demog-
raphy of the country. Having an accurate portrait of the fertility patterns of the
Jews in Israel and the West Bank would add to our wealth of knowledge about
the region and bring greater clarity in the hope of a peace process.
1Taken from the 2008 documentary: Where in the World is Osama Bin Laden?
Chapter 1
LITERATURE REVIEW
To fully understand the scope of fertility issues in Israel it is critical to understand
speciﬁc details of the country, its people and its history. Given the enormous
cultural and religious diversity within the country and the long-lasting state of
belligerence between the Arab Palestinians and the Jews that began over 90
years ago, a brief overview of the country’s origins and of the long process that
led to the creation of the state of Israel forms the ﬁrst part of the literature
review. Such information is pertinent to the behaviors that inﬂuence fertility in
the country today. The second part of the chapter reviews previous studies on the
fertility of the Jews, and most speciﬁcally in Israel, highlighting the main known
factors that inﬂuence Jewish fertility in the region. A thorough reading of these
studies will identify the limitations associated with this type of research. This
literature review will help us evaluate which methodology should be employed in
this mémoire and hence, understand how the knowledge on the subject will be
increased with the analyses.
1.1. Context of the study
1.1.1. A century of Zionism and immigration to Palestine
In the 2,000 years prior to the twentieth century, the Jewish community lived
dispersed among the nations of the world, having only their common religious
background to unite them. They built several Jewish communities all over the
8world but particularly in Europe where they lived in peace for centuries. How-
ever, ever since the Babylonian exile1, many Jews manifested the desire to return
to Israel, a movement called aliya2 (Portugese, 1998). The movement eventually
gained momentum and led to the creation of Zionism. It is a term that refers
to the ideological and political program of a movement that arose at the end of
the nineteenth century in Europe and that had as its main goal the creation of a
Jewish state and a homeland for the Jews in Palestine, the historic and spiritual
homeland of the Jews (Portugese, 1998). Zionists considered Jewish immigration
to Palestine essential for ideological and practical reasons. They considered that
the “return to the land of their forefathers” was a duty for every single Jew in the
world. Consequently, a massive Jewish presence in Palestine would justify their
claim to the land (Laqueur, 1989).
The Zionist movement gained immense popularity among Jews and reached a
peak in the 1880’s (Barnavie, 1982). At that time a general negative feeling
against the Jews prevailed among people of other nations of the world. Western
European Jews had a hard time integrating the newly liberal-democratic norms
and rules of their countries of adoption (Portugese, 1998). They were received
with suspicion if not downright hostility (Tessler, 1994).
Some Jews believed that they brought anti-Semitism3 on themselves due to their
previous transgressions against God and were now being forced to live a life of
physical and spiritual exile. Their statelessness gave them an “abnormal status”.
Because they lacked a national homeland, they had become inferior and sickly
people causing the Gentiles4 to despise them (Portugese, 1998).
Motivated by the belief that anti-Semitism would never fade, a number of Jews
1According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, many scholars refer to 597 BC as the year of
the ﬁrst deportation of the Jews.
2Literally means “ascend”, the immigration of Jews to Israel.
3A prejudice against or hostility towards the Jews.
4A person who is not Jewish.
9concluded that the solution to the “Jewish problem” was to create an independent
state to which Jews from all over the world would be free to immigrate and put an
end to the exile of the Jewish community (Avineri, 1981). The Zionist movement
then launched a series of massive waves of immigration.
During the period from 1882 to 1903, between 25,000 and 30,000 Jews immigrated
to Palestine, which was under Ottoman control. Despite regulations against Jew-
ish land purchases and settlement, a second wave of immigration took place be-
tween 1905 and 1914 in which 35,000 to 40,000 Jews came to Palestine, escaping
an escalation of anti-Semitic violence (Wolﬀsohn, 1987).
From the start of the British mandate of Palestine in 1922 until the start of
World War II, more than 360,000 Jews immigrated (Tessler, 1994). This change
of government from Ottoman to Brithish control allowed a more permissive pol-
icy toward Jewish immigration at a time when anti-Semitism and Nazism kept
increasing in Europe. Subsequently, as the native Arabs began to fear their own
territorial displacement, they started to protest by staging strikes and revolts.
As a result of these manifestations, Jewish immigration was restricted in May
1939 allowing the entry of only 75,000 Jewish immigrants and 25,000 refugees for
the next ﬁve years after which no further Jewish immigrants or refugees would be
allowed without ﬁrst meeting with the approval of the local Arab population (Por-
tugese, 1998). As a result of this new policy, approximately 70,000 Jews came
to Palestine illegally during the war and until the end of the British mandate
(Tessler, 1994).
1.1.2. The creation of the state of Israel
As mentioned earlier, Palestine was under Ottoman rule for about 400 hun-
dred years (1517-1917) until replaced by a British colonial mandatory government
(Portugese, 1998). Contrary to the Turks, the British followed a pro-Zionist pol-
icy. Indeed, they issued a statement on November 2, 1917 outlining their support
for the Zionist political program. In the statement, the British Foreign Minister,
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Balfour pledged his support to the establishment of a “Jewish national home in
Palestine”. Oﬃcially starting in 1922, the British Mandate for Palestine formal-
ized the British rule in Palestine from 1917 to 1948 (Portugese, 1998).
Jewish immigration in Palestine increased a lot during the British mandate. As
the tension grew between Jews and Arabs, Churchill was urged to clarify the
meaning of the Balfour Declaration. This resulted in the preparation of a white
paper in 1922 that reassured both Jewish and Arab communities by stating that
the Jews were in Palestine “as a right and not on suﬀerance” and that the allow-
able number of Jewish immigrants would be limited to the “economic capacity
of the country” (Tessler, 1994). It also stipulated that the area east of the Jor-
dan River would be excluded from Jewish settlements. This area was renamed
Transjordan (Kramer, 2008).
Figure 1.1. Palestine and Transjordan under the British Man-
date, 1922
Source: Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conﬂict c©1994
After an outbreak of the Arab revolution in 1936-1937, the Peel Commission
arrived in Palestine to investigate the reasons behind the uprising. The report
published in 1937 stipulated that many of the Palestinian grievances were gen-
uine and that the disturbances had been caused by “the desire of the Arabs for
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national independence”. They also noticed that the causes that brought the dis-
turbances in 1936 were the same as the ones that brought many of the previous
disturbances. These ﬁndings brought the members of the Commission to issue
a recommendation for the future of the state. The British mandate of Pales-
tine should be terminated and in order for each national community to govern
itself, the territory should be partitioned (Tessler, 1994). Even though the Peel
Commission report was rejected, the partition of the territory has been proposed
many times as a solution to the deepening conﬂict.
In 1947, the British government turned the matter over to the United Nations.
The UN formed a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to make recom-
mendations concerning the future of the country. They submitted a report in
August that contained a majority and a minority proposal. The Arabs rejected
both proposals stating that Palestine was an integral part of the Arab world. On
the other hand, the Jews were willing to accept the recommendations of the ma-
jority proposal. The borders of the Arab and Jewish states recognized after the
termination of the mandate diﬀer from those proposed by the UNSCOP (Tessler,
1994).
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Figure 1.2. United Nations General Assembly Partition Plan, 1947
Source: Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conﬂict c©1994
The independence of Israel was proclaimed about six months after the adop-
tion of the UNSCOP resolution, on May 14th 1948. Many neighboring Arab
countries attacked Israel after its creation such as Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Syria.
They were unwilling to recognize the new state but as soon as 1949, many of
these countries signed Armistice agreements with Israel (Tessler, 1994).
1.1.3. Israel as a war society
It is clear that the process leading to the creation of the Jewish state of Israel
has been long and marked by numerous conﬂicts within and outside their borders.
Israel has fought seven major wars and two prolonged intifadas5 in a little over 60
years of existence. As a result of the country’s focus on so many wars during such
a short period of time, many of the most inﬂuential members of Israel’s political
elite come from the military (Richards and Waterbury, 1990). The Israeli army
5Intifada is an uprising among Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza strip in protest
against continued occupation of these territories. The ﬁrst one took place from 1987 to 1993
and the second one, from 2000 to 2005.
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is one of the primary national symbols of the state itself. As mentioned by Por-
tugese (1998): “(. . . ) the extent of the military’s inroads into and inﬂuence upon
society is so great that it is possible to use the term “militarized” when referring
to it”. National security is the one issue that informs almost all of Israel’s policy
decisions (Portugese, 1998). Indeed as Richards and Waterbury (1990) stipulate,
Middle Eastern countries have had more than their share of conﬂicts throughout
their existence and as a result, have devoted their human and material resources
for defence and war more than most other developped countries of the world.
Israel is no exception.
The previous maps show that ever since the creation of a Jewish homeland in
Palestine, the deﬁnition of the borders of what would be the Jewish and Arab
states changed many times and are still a key point in discussions for a future
peace agreement. Arab territories have been limited to two regions: the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel occupied both territories until 2004 when the settle-
ments in the Gaza Strip have been dismantled. The settlements keep increasing
as of today in the West Bank. The very dense Palestinian population is conﬁned
to an increasingly small territory.
This research focuses speciﬁcally on the Jewish population that lives in the set-
tlements of the West Bank in comparison to these living in Israel. To better
understand their behaviour and their attitudes toward fertility, the proceeding
discussion describes why they live in these settlements and which key factors
pushed them to settle in this kind of environment.
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Figure 1.3. Jewish population of the West Bank, 1988
Source: Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conﬂict c©1994
1.1.3.1. Jewish settlements in the West Bank
During the Six-Day War of 1967, the Israeli army gained control of many
territories that were under Arab control, including the Gaza strip and the West
Bank (also called Judea and Samaria). Judea and Samaria are the heartland of
the biblical land of Israel. A group of Jews dedicated themselves to the establish-
ment of Jewish settlements in the region. Later on, the government permitted the
Jewish settlements in a land that was until then solely populated by Arabs. By
the mid-1990s over 150,000 Jews lived in these settlements of Judea and Samaria
and the Gaza strip (Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of Israel, 2002). The Israeli gov-
ernment dismantled the Gaza strip settlements in 2004 due to persistent pressures
from the International Community.
According to the International Community, the Israeli occupation of the Pales-
tinian Territories is illegal due to non compliance with the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention which stipulates that the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer
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parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies6. With the
support of the United States, the International Community pressures Israel to
dismantle the settlements in the West Bank because they are considered to be a
violation of international law. Israel rejects applying the Convention stating that
the territory was captured in 1967 as a result of a defensive war against Jordan
and Egypt, countries which had illegaly occupied them since 1948. Despite the
pressure, there are still, as of May 2009, 280,000 Israeli citizens living in 121 set-
tlements (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2009).
The Jewish settlements are build by the state. To encourage Israeli citizens
to move to the settlements or to encourage those already living there to stay
and to solidify Israel’s hold on Judea and Samaria, the Israeli government of-
fers a lot of beneﬁts and incentives. Two types of beneﬁts and incentives are
oﬀered: support directly granted to the citizens of the settlements and support
that grants settlement local authorities that favors them over local authorities
in Israel. A description of these beneﬁts and incentives will be provided to take
notice of the components of the government policy that inﬂuence the standard
of living of Israeli citizens and might impact on their decision to “immigrate” to
the West Bank. They are granted by six government ministries (B’tselem, 2002)7 :
(1) The Ministry of Construction and Housing provides generous assistance
for people who purchase a new apartment or build a house in a settlement.
They provide these individuals with loans that can be converted in grants
after a number of years depending on the type of area the settlement is
in.
(2) The Israel Lands Administration provides discounts from forty-nine per-
cent to sixty-nine percent (depending on the classiﬁcation of the area of
6Fourth Geneva Convention, article 49, 1949
7B’tselem is an Israeli human rights organization (NGO) that was established in 1989 by
a group of prominent academics, attorneys, journalists and Knesset members. Its main goal is
to document and educate the Israeli public and policymakers about human rights violations in
the Occupied Territories.
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the settlement) from the value of the land in the payment of lease fees for
residential construction.
(3) The Ministry of Education provides teachers in some settlements with pro-
motions and exempts them from various employees’ fees. The children’s
parents in these settlements are granted discounts of ninety percent for
tuition fees in pre-compulsory kindergartens. The Ministry also covers all
transportation costs for students to school in all the settlements.
(4) The Ministry of Industry and Trade provides grants and income tax ben-
eﬁts in all areas for enterprises that qualify for government support. The
Ministry also established new industrial zones for which they grant enter-
prises signiﬁcant discounts on land prices.
(5) The Ministry of Labor and Social Aﬀairs provides social workers with
packages of beneﬁts similar to those of teachers.
(6) The Ministry of Finance provides residents of some settlements reductions
in the payment of income taxes at rates that vary from ﬁve to twenty per-
cent. Most settlements beneﬁt of a seven percent income-tax reduction.
There are also beneﬁts and incentives for the local authorities in the settlements.
Their advantage compared to local authorities in Israel relies on the channeling
of money through the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization.
Because the Division is not a state body, their function is the good functioning
of the public infrastructures of the settlements and to support their development.
For an exhaustive description of the beneﬁts and incentives provided by the Israeli
government to the settlers of the West Bank, see B’tselem (2002).
1.2. What we know of Jewish fertility
Despite all the changes that occurred in the past 60 years in the developed
world Israel managed to sustain its fertility at a level that is considerably higher
than that found in comparable industrialized countries. In 2009 Jewish women
in Israel had a fertility rate of 2.90 children per woman (Statistical Abstract of
Israel, 2010: table 3.13). This TFR is above the replacement level evaluated
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at 2.1 children per woman. Finding an explanation of the high fertility level of
Israeli women can be complex. However fertility behaviour has been extensively
studied by demographers and other social scientists and it has been approached
from a variety of perspectives.
Israel’s fertility history is complex. While the Israeli TFR described above re-
mains above replacement levels, like all industrialized countries, Israel has ex-
perienced a fertility transition. The Jewish population of Israel nevertheless
experienced a general decline of their fertility in the past century. The classi-
cal demographic transition theory highlights economic development as a major
inﬂuence on declining fertility. In this sense, modernization reduces children’s
role as security for parents, and the trend toward mass education decreases their
availability for work (Okun, 1997). The population has undergone a rapid mod-
ernization from the ﬁrst generation of Israelis who lived in traditional societies
prior to 1960 with a regime of high fertility and mortality and low incomes to
the subsequent generation of the 1980’s and 1990’s who lived in a more modern
society with lower fertility, lower child mortality and higher incomes.
Figure 1.4. Fertility rates of the Jewish population of Israel, 1960-2008
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2009: table 3.13
As seen in Figure 1.4, the total Jewish population of Israel managed to lower its
fertility between 1960 and 1990 and fertility rates stabilized during the 1990’s
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(Sardon, 2006). Jewish Israeli fertility nevertheless remained higher than in most
other developed countries. The lowest fertility rate was recorded in the 1990s and
since then started to rise again. Manski and Mayshar (2003) describe this Jew-
ish Israeli new trend as a “reverse fertility transition” mainly due to the still very
high fertility of ultra-orthodox women. They conclude that this reverse transition
arose out of the combination of two key factors: non-continuity in private behav-
ior and social interactions as each woman is inﬂuenced by the fertility decisions
of other women.
Israel is a country of numerous contrasts notably because of the fact that it was
built on massive immigration. It has brought to Israel people from all around
the world with a great variety of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
and attitudes toward fertility. Ever since the creation of the state about 60 years
ago and even before there have been many waves of immigration from various
regions mostly from Poland, the former U.S.S.R., Romania, Germany, Austria
and later on, from many other countries such as the Arab countries, the United
States, Ethiopia, etc.
Upon arriving in Israel, these immigrants discover a society with a distinct fer-
tility behavior. Indirect determinants of fertility such as sexual relations out of
wedlock, age at marriage, use of fertility control, etc. are diﬀerent in Israel than in
their country of origin. Having access to a diﬀerent lifestyle allows them to adapt
their fertility levels. Fargues (2000) stresses the extreme contrasts of fertility in
Israel between new immigrants and the rest of the population after a few years in
the country, the immigrant population has adopted a new fertility behavior that
is in between the fertility trend in the new country and the one of their country
of origin (as shown in Figure 1.5). Anson and Meir (1996) also noticed the con-
vergence of fertility patterns of Jewish immigrants toward the fertility of Israel
born women through the years. They mention that immigrant groups with the
lowest fertility (Europe-America and USSR) have substantially higher fertility
than the mean fertility level in their country of origin. They are over-reproducing
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in comparison with the European standard.
Figure 1.5. Total fertility rates of the Jewish population by
mother’s country of birth, 1963-1998
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2009: table 3.15
About 30% of the Jewish population of Israel whose father was not born in Israel
was of North African or West Asian origin in 2008 (Statistical Abstract of Israel,
2009: table 2.24). These two groups have a recent history of high fertility and
high family size norms. Even if their fertility would dramatically drop, they would
have higher fertility levels than their counterparts from European or American
origin. However Anson and Meir (1996) mention that the high fertility of Jewish
women of African and Asian descent cannot explain the high fertility of Israel as
a whole because even immigrants with a diﬀerent cultural background show an
inexplicably high fertility compared to their country of origin.
Researchers attempting to explain the factors associated with Jewish Israeli fer-
tility have highlighted religiosity, pro-natalist policies, and belligerence. Reli-
giosity is an important factor that inﬂuences fertility, especially in Israel. It can
be deﬁned as the fact of being religious and the impact of your sensibility on
your religious attitude. People who immigrate to Israel are religious in diﬀerent
degrees and religiosity has direct and indirect eﬀects on fertility. Even though
20
Keysar et al. (1992) mention that religiosity alone is insuﬃcient to explain the
changes in fertility behaviour it is sometimes used in studies as an explanatory
variable for fertility. Indeed religious people will tend to follow the directives of
the religious authorities. In the case of Judaism high fertility is very well praised
and the use of contraception or sterilization is discouraged. For that matter peo-
ple with strong religious values are often associated with higher fertility levels.
Manski and Mayshar (2003) show that ultra-orthodox women in Israel have a lot
more children than all other groups. In a study on religiosity diﬀerences Fried-
lander (2002) also noted that the orthodox population shows fertility levels above
their group averages.
The ultra-orthodox population of Israel has strong political power and receives
speciﬁc funds allocated to families by their community institutions and secured
by governmental authorities. They can ﬁnance their own educational system
in which men are provided many years of religious education while women are
expected to work and support the family. They are characterized by early mar-
riages, the expectation of having a child within the ﬁrst year of marriage and the
encouragement of fertility as a norm throughout the marriage (Landau, 2003).
Friedlander and Feldman (1993) argue that without the participation of the reli-
gious section of Israel the fertility would be at or approaching the level found in
European countries. Religiosity among other variables aﬀects the total fertility
rate. According to the General Social Survey of Israel of 2004, a little over 18%
of the female population is considered to be religious. A study of Israel’s fertility
by DellaPergola (2007) highlights the impact of religiosity. He mentions that the
attained family size grows in direct relation with self-assessed religiosity. In fact,
it is said to be the most importanxt factor in explaining births of parity 5 or more.
He concludes by saying that the power of religiosity as an explanatory variable
of fertility is related to a comparatively “small minority highly focussed on their
ideal life goals”. Another study of religiosity by Hartman (1984) came to the
conclusion that religiosity has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on fertility that is not the result
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of a “spurious relationship with the main factors of diﬀerential fertility in Israel,
education and ethnicity”. He also found that this eﬀect prevails not only among
the most extremely religious groups but can be observed among other groups as
the scale of religiosity increases.
Despite the fact that many studies tend to show that there is a link between
religiosity and higher fertility, there is no consensus in the literature. For ex-
ample, Anson and Meir (1996) argue that previous explanations based on ethnic
origin, composition of the population and on religiosity are sociologically incom-
plete and that arguments that religious groups in Israel have higher fertility than
do non-religious groups are not substated.
Turning from religion to policy, the importance of Israeli institutions and their
role in maintaining a high fertility must not be underestimated. In the mid 1960’s
a committee had been appointed and charged with advising the government of a
future population policy. Their report found that fertility among Jewish women
in Israel was extremely low and that at the same time, the fertility of Israel’s
Arab minorities, particularly the Muslims, continued to be alarmingly high. Left
“unchecked these longterm trends constituted a threat to the political, social, cul-
tural, and security position of the Jewish state” (Schiﬀ, 1981).
Since the 1960’s, Israel has developed a very pronatalist approach (Landau, 2003)
with policies focused on reproductive health and family rights. With these poli-
cies, the government developed one of the most generous child allowance programs
in the world (Manski and Mayshar, 2003). Israel oﬀers monthly payments to fam-
ilies with one or two children; for the fourth child and up the payments become
substantial even though it had been demonstrated that the more children a person
has, the lower the marginal cost of care for the nth child is (National Insurance
Institute Statistical Quarterly and Yearbooks). In addition to the allowance pro-
grams, Israel oﬀers free services for pregnant women and infants and women who
experience diﬃculties conceiving (Landau, 2003). All pregnant women have free
22
access to pre-natal care including all sorts of screenings and ultra-sounds at least
three times during their pregnancies. Mothers have access to free developmental
examinations and vaccines for their infants (Manski and Mayshar, 2003).
Israel’s pro-natalist policies now extent to the use of reproductive technologies. Is-
rael is the country with the highest rate of in-vitro fertilization clinics per capita in
the world. Another service which facilitates the creation of families is gestational
surrogacy; Israel is the only country in which surrogacy is explicitly legalized
(Landau, 2003). There are also programs to ensure that once the baby is born
he/she is cared for. These programs provide access to free education and health
insurance, generous maternity grants, tax beneﬁts for working mothers and even
housing beneﬁts depending on the size of the family (Manski and Mayshar, 2003).
The Israeli government devotes much energy and funding to these pronatalist poli-
cies. In contrast, no funds are allocated to contraception and sterilization is not a
common practice. Abortion is allowed only under very restrictive conditions and
has to be approved by a doctor (Population Policy Data Bank, United Nations).
Given the fact that these welfare policies were established in the 1970’s when the
Jewish fertility began to decline, they must have had a certain success in main-
taining a high fertility level.
One important and speciﬁc characteristic of Israel that has shaped its history
is a perpetual state of belligerence and the nationalism of its population. Its
Jewish character gives the country a speciﬁc status in the Middle East. The con-
stant tension with the neighboring countries and with the diﬀerent communities
within the country generates strong nationalist sentiments. As Courbage (1999)
said, bearing many children is an insurance policy against the loss of children
and men in a situation of conﬂict. Thousands of Jews and Arabs have died in
Israel’s many wars. Maintaining a high fertility would make up for the losses
suﬀered during wartime. Conﬂict can shape ideational changes that are related
to fertility, sharpening identities and the vision of the nation thus making natality
a corollary of nationalism (McNicoll, 2001). Anson and Meir (1996) commented
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on this phenomenon in Israel and stated that the perpetual conﬂict reinforces
the Jewish values in the daily life which translates in an enhanced religiosity.
DellaPergola (2007) also links Jewish Israeli’s fertility with nationalism by say-
ing that the high fertility levels could be a way of “enhancing the role of Israel’s
Jewish population vis-à-vis a demographically declining Jewish Diaspora”. Por-
tugese (1998) stipulates that “an increase in the militarization of a society tends
to be positively correlated with the emergence of pronatalist government policies”
(Portugese, 1998).
According to Courbage (1999) this conﬂict created a “war of the cradles”. Indeed,
Arab women in Israel maintained a higher fertility level than Jewish women over
the years despite a constant decline (3.73 children per Arab woman compared to
2.90 for all women in 2009) (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2009: table 3.13). Jew-
ish Israeli women could be induced to have more children in order to protect their
numerical majority in the country. Nahmias and Stecklov (2007) also conclude
that the high fertility in Israel is closely related to the state of belligerence:
“(...) the local political environment is one of endemic conﬂict, with
consequent direct impacts on ethno-religious identities and indirect
impacts on fertility. A cessation of conﬂict would modify fertility
behavior of all Israelis, possibly dramatically.”
Through this review of the very special context in which Israeli families live, it
becomes clear that fertility in Israel has to be studied and understood in a broader
view than just by demographic and socioeconomic factors. Their complex reality
must always be kept in mind.
1.3. Limits of previous studies on fertility
Studying fertility diﬀerentials is a hard task and many researchers have tried
the experience with various population groups. However most of these studies
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contain many shortcomings. Indeed, there exist many studies that focus on fer-
tility diﬀerentials among diﬀerent population groups. Most of them emphasize
the fact that diﬀerent religious or ethnic groups have a diﬀerent fertility behav-
ior within the same country or region. Examples of such studies are: fertility
diﬀerentials of Protestants and Catholics in Ireland (Minority Group Status and
Fertility: The Irish) by Kennedy (1973) or fertility diﬀerentials of Muslim and
Non-Muslim populations in Asia (Muslim and non-Muslim diﬀerences in female
autonomy and fertility: evidence from four Asian countries) by Morgan et al.
(2002).
The fertility in Israel is well documented. Studies of fertility diﬀerentials have
even compared the fertility of the Jews, Christians and Muslims (Goldscheider
and Friedlander, 1974) on a national level. The existing literature, however, lacks
extensive studies of fertility within the Jewish population on a smaller scale, i.e.,
there is no information on the Jews who decided to leave Israel or to immigrate
to the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. The statistics show that
it is those Jews that have a diﬀerent behavior than the ones living in Israel. The
heterogeneity of the Jewish population of Israel is regularly mentioned in various
researches but very few of them do consider the subgroups within the Jewish
population. Even though it is known that there is a lack of knowledge of these
populations, no study is made at a community level. One research by Keysar
(1992) about the fertility in the Kibbutzim8 partially addresses this issue, and is
the only research found that does not study the Jewish population of Israel as
a whole at a national level. Kibbutzs are not as widespread today in the region
as they were at the time of the creation of the state. They were mostly located
where the Jewish settlements are located today in the Occupied Territories. It
may be pertinent to suggest that this population has characteristics similar to
the one studied in this project.
Most of these studies are based on a descriptive analysis. They provide simple
8A Kibbutz is a collective community in Israel that is traditionally based on agriculture.
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summaries on the fertility of a given population and help ﬁgure out which vari-
ables have an impact on that population. They fail to give a proper explanation
as to why the fertility of the diﬀerent groups diﬀers and provide no information
as to the extent of the impact of each variable. When making an explanatory
analysis, it is possible to test hypotheses about the impact that some variables
might have on fertility and get a better understanding of the role of the variables
in increasing or decreasing fertility.
Another issue related to these researches on fertility is that most of them use
the same set of variables while every study has a speciﬁc condition that might
require a diﬀerent combination of variables to properly describe the fertility be-
haviors. Indeed, demographic and socioeconomic variables such as age, marital
status, income, level of educations are among the most commonly used. How-
ever, as it has been shown in the case of Israel, these variables are most likely
not enough to fully comprehend the fertility of Jewish women. The speciﬁcity of
Israel in terms of religiosity and ideologies requires a wider set of variables that
are closer to the reality of the country. In many surveys or censuses, variables
of that kind, i.e., on religiosity and/or politics, are not available. Luckily, in the
survey used for this research, a question on religiosity is available and will provide
added value to the literature on fertility.
Chapter 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter will consist of a review of the diﬀerent existing theories on fertility
diﬀerentials. Knowing about these theories will allow us to formulate a series
of clear objectives of research and hypotheses that will be explained in the later
section of the present chapter.
2.1. Theory on fertility differentials
Many researchers have tried to ﬁnd a proper explanation to fertility diﬀeren-
tials for a very long time, starting with the Economist Gary Becker. He argued
that women choose the optimal family size in the light of a marginal-cost1 and
marginal-beneﬁt2 framework (Becker and Murphy, 2000). However, his theory
has been criticized because it fails to explain why the fertility transition has oc-
curred in diﬀerent places of the world in diﬀerent economic situations (Manski
and Mayshar, 2003). Researchers have felt the need to incorporate sociological el-
ements to the existing economic models explaining fertility, arguing that economic
and sociological factors complement each other to produce a more comprehensive
model of fertility behavior. In general, both economic and sociological approaches
must be considered in a fertility study. Friedlander (2002) argued that Israel’s
fertility patterns revolve around three major socio-demographic dimensions: reli-
gion, ethnicity and socioeconomic structure. The inﬂuence of these factors among
1Change in total cost that arises when the quatity produced changes by one unit.
2The utility gained (or lost) from an increase (or decrease) in the consumption of that good
or service.
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others on fertility in the Israeli context will be described later.
For that matter, it is important to elaborate a theoretical framework that will
present the fundamental relationships among fertility and not only socioeconomic
variables but also demographic and religious variables. As mentioned earlier, reli-
gious, ethnic and regional fertility diﬀerentials have been empirically documented
in a large number of countries. Many variables having direct or indirect eﬀects on
fertility have also been highlighted. I will now review the diﬀerent hypotheses that
have been formulated as to how these religious, socioeconomic and demographic
variables aﬀect fertility.
2.1.1. Religious diﬀerences in fertility
The incorporation of religious variables in the study of social systems is be-
coming more common. Indeed, religion is the most common manifestation of
value orientations, especially regarding the family even in contemporary secular-
ized societies. For this reason, social researchers and demographers must ﬁnd a
way to incorporate a variable that measures the expression of religion such as
religiosity in their studies. There are a few approaches in the literature that have
been established as to how to consider the inﬂuence of religion on fertility.
2.1.1.1. The characteristics approach
The characteristics approach (assimilationist) is based on the argument that
religious diﬀerentials in fertility are essentially the result of diﬀerences in the de-
mographic, social, and economic attributes of the members of the religious or
ethnic groups (Chamie, 1981). It is not the fact of belonging to a speciﬁc reli-
gious group that aﬀects fertility trends as much as the demographic, social and
economic characteristics of the individuals in the group that will determine the
trend. According to this approach, after having controlled for demographic and
socioeconomic statuses in a study, there should not be signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
fertility anymore.
The characteristics approach is pertinent to the context of Jewish fertility in
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Israel. Even though I am studying individuals belonging to the same religious
group, the fact of living in two diﬀerent regions might expose them to diﬀerent
living conditions. The Jews of Israel and of the West Bank have some diﬀerent
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. According to the 2004 General
Social Survey of Israel, women living is Israel are slightly younger than those
living in the West Bank. Sixteen percent of women in Israel are aged between
20 and 24 compared to only 12% in the West Bank. There is another major
demographic diﬀerence between the two population groups: marriage intensity is
higher in the West Bank. Despite the younger age of women in Israel, 87% of the
Jewish population in the West Bank is married compared to 63% in Israel (GSS,
2004). Nonetheless, women in the two areas also bear similarities. They both
are approximately equally educated with about 30% of women having attended
University (GSS, 2004). The gross family income per month in Israel including
the West Bank has been established at 6972 NIS in 2004, which is equivalent
to approximately 1950$ CAN (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2006: table 12.41).
In both Israel and the West Bank, 68% of the families had a monthly income
equivalent or under the country’s mean (GSS, 2004).
Through this project I will be able to determine if diﬀerences in the fertility
patterns remain even after controlling for such demographic and socioeconomic
variables. If this is the case, one theoretical approach to explaining fertility diﬀer-
entials cannot be used on its own but has to be combined with other approaches
to have a broader and more comprehensive understanding of fertility diﬀerentials.
Moreover all hypotheses regarding religion and fertility have been criticized but
are still used because they may supply part of the answer despite the fact that
they cannot provide researchers with a complete explanation of the phenomenon.
On the characteristics approach, Goldscheider has said that it fails to admit to
the vitality of religious group memberships in modern societies (Goldscheider,
1971).
29
2.1.1.2. Particularized theology
If diﬀerences persist even after applying appropriate controls for the groups’
socioeconomic proﬁle, the use of the particularized theology hypothesis can help
provide further explanations of the diﬀerences in fertility behavior. Unlike the
characteristics approach, the particularized theology hypothesis functions at a
macro level. Indeed, according to this hypothesis the religious fertility diﬀer-
entials are due to diﬀerences in church doctrines between major faith groups
(Chamie, 1981). Consequently precepts and injunctions of religion could inﬂu-
ence fertility desires and contraceptive practice (Alagarajan, 2003). To sum up,
the fertility level of a religious group could be accounted for by the teachings on
questions regarding childbearing by religious leaders.
Researchers have largely criticized this hypothesis and Goldscheider mentioned
that the “particularized theology” approach was a naive and limited attempt to
capture the religious dimension (McQuillan, 1999). In another research, he con-
cludes that there are substantial net eﬀects of religion and religiosity on the sexual
behaviour and contraceptive practices of individuals but they are not theologically
derived (Goldscheider and Mosher, 1991). No hypothesis can fully explain the
phenomenon but a combination of these two classic approaches (characteristics
approach and particularized theology) has almost always been used to interpret
Jewish fertility in spite of these critics (Goldscheider, 1971).
Unfortunately, there is no information about the non-Jewish population living
in the West Bank in the 2004 General Social Survey of Israel. For that matter,
a comparison of the fertility levels of the members of the diﬀerent religions that
coexist in the region is not possible. However, such data is available through the
Statistical Abstract of Israel on a national level. Figure 3.2 will show the diﬀerent
fertility levels of the Jewish, Muslim and Christian population of Israel in the
past decades.
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Figure 2.1. Fertility rates of Jewish, Muslim and Christian
women in Israel, 1960-2004
Source: Statistical Abstract, 2005: table 3.12
There is a clear diﬀerence between the fertility levels of the Jewish and Muslim
population all through the period. The fertility of the Christians is closer to that
of the Jews. It is known that the Muslim fertility is higher than that of Jews and
Christians. Fargues (2000) mentions the hypothesis according to which Islamism
encourages fertility while trying to explain their high fertility. Figure 2.1 could
support the particularized theology approach because there is a diﬀerence in the
fertility levels of the diﬀerent religions. However, the diﬀerence shrinks over the
years which could be explained with the next hypothesis, the secularization hy-
pothesis.
This approach could also be used by considering the diﬀerent factions of judaism
as diﬀerent religions. As they have very diﬀerent behaviors toward fertility, the
rabbis 3 of these factions might carry a diﬀerent set of values from one another to
their followers. The diﬀerent values of the diﬀerent factions within judaism will
be discussed in the next hypothesis.
3A rabbi is a scholar qualiﬁed to interpret Jewish law.
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2.1.1.3. Secularization hypothesis
This theory was ﬁrst brought up in the literature in the 1960’s and refers to
the impact that the emergence of ideologies not based on religious teachings had
on society. Basically, as modernization progresses, churches and other places of
worship serve a narrower function. Simons (1980) suggested that a switch from
an “institutional religion” to a “civil religion” had been made in which people may
still subscribe strongly to a morality that upholds the functional prerequisites of
societal integration and continuity.
In a study on the demographic and cultural changes in Western Europe, Lesthaeghe
(1983) mentions that the transition from natural to controlled fertility is the result
of the shift in the ideational system to an increasing priority placed on individual
goal attainment. Without the more generalized tendency toward secularization,
fertility would have remained largely in the domain of the sacred instead of that
of individual freedom of choice. For that matter, secularization and fertility are
closely linked. A decrease in fertility in the recent decades could easily be asso-
ciated with the secularization hypothesis. Indeed, Lesthaeghe (1980) highlighted
the fact that the degree of secularization accounted independently for substantial
portions of the variance in the relative speed of the regional declines in marital
fertility. He even states that the most conservative statistical tests underestimate
the impact of secularization on fertility.
In the context of Jewish fertility, there are various elements within the Jew-
ish community who are characterized by very diﬀerent attitudes toward religion.
For that matter, the Jewish community is generally considered an ethnoreligious
group4 rather than solely a religious grouping. For example, on one end there are
the Haredi Jews who are considered to be the most conservative form of Orthodox
Judaism. They consider their belief system and religious practices to extend in
an unbroken chain back to Moses and the giving of the Torah on Mount Sinai. As
4An ethnoreligious group is an ethnic group of people whose members are also uniﬁed by a
common religious background
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a result, they consider non-Orthodox factions of Judaism to be deviations from
authentic Judaism. On the other end, there are individuals who consider them-
selves as belonging to a secular Jewish culture. Secular Judaism was driven by
the values of the European Enlightenment and Jewish communities have seen the
development of a cultural identity that is in some sense characteristically Jewish
without being at all speciﬁcally religious.
There are diﬀerences as to how religious people consider themselves to be in
the West Bank and Israel. Twenty-seven percent of the people interviewed in the
2004 General Social Survey declared being Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) in the West
Bank as opposed to 10% in Israel. Similarly, 47% of the population declared
being secular in Israel and 27% in the West Bank. Secularization seems to be
well established in Israel but still is rather rare in the West Bank.
Despite a certain level of obscurity in Judaism regarding family-size norms and
various reproductive behaviors it has been hypothesized that the families who
are religious have larger family-size ideals than secular families. It has also been
documented that there is a negative relationship between religiosity and contra-
ceptive use. The literature has also shown that the Israeli government has put in
place a lot of incentives to encourage individuals to have larger families.
2.1.1.4. Minority Group Status hypothesis
The minority group status hypothesis can be engaged with as an alternative
to the previous hypotheses. It integrates the analysis of religious diﬀerentials
in fertility in the social organization 5. This hypothesis is especially interesting
in the context of this study because it highlights fertility diﬀerentials not only
among diﬀerent religious groups, but also among racial and ethnic groups. For
this reason, this hypothesis is deﬁnitely the most commonly documented in the
5The social organization of a group includes how people interact, the kinship system used,
marriage residency patterns, division of various tasks, etc.
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literature. A minority group is deﬁned in quantitative6 and psychological terms.
The eﬀect of being aﬃliated with a certain religious or ethnic group will diﬀer
depending on whether this group represents a major or minor subgroup within
the whole population. The fertility of the group will be either higher or lower
than that of their counterparts in a majority situation depending on diﬀerent
factors such as acculturation and socioeconomic variables.
Studies employing this hypothesis led to diﬀerent conclusions. According to
Goldscheider (1971), a minority group that doesn’t have an organized system
that reﬂects their values might have a residual lower fertility resulting from the
insecurities associated with the minority group status, e.g., racism or a precarious
socioeconomic condition that they do not want to pass on to the next generations.
Morgan et al. (2002), while studying the Muslim-Non-Muslim fertility diﬀeren-
tials in four Asian countries came to a diﬀerent conclusion. They concluded that
minority groups tend to have a higher fertility than the majority group to assure
their survival in the community. They emphasized aspects of family life that are
conducing to childbearing or a reduced use of contraception.
It is possible to use this hypothesis to explain the fertility levels of each group
separately in their own regional context. In the ﬁrst case, the Jewish community
living in the West Bank constitutes a minority group in the region representing
17% of the total population while Arabs and Christians represent 75% and 8%
respectively (Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook : 2011). It could
be hypothesized that the Jewish minority maintains a high fertility compared to
their Arab counterparts in the West Bank as a way to maintain their presence in
the territory and ensure the future of their cultural group and of the settlements.
This would support the “war of the cradles” thesis deﬁned by Courbage (1999).
Inversely, it could be argued that the lower fertility of the Jewish population
6A minority group is a distinct group that represents less than 50% of the population
(Kennedy, 1973).
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living in Israel is due to their majority status in the region. In fact, 2% of the
population is Christian, 16% Moslem and 77% Jewish (Statistical Abstract of Is-
rael, 2005: table 2.1). Given the fact that they represent the majority of the
population, they don’t need to over-reproduce to ensure the survival of their sub-
group in the Jewish nation.
It is important to use this hypothesis with caution. Goldscheider (1971) speciﬁes
that the fertility of minority groups must be treated within a broader context of
social behavior and organization.
2.1.1.5. Interaction hypothesis
Based on the information gathered on the hypotheses presented previously
and diﬀerent studies on the impact of religion on fertility, none of these hypothe-
ses seems entirely adequate to explain the phenomenon. Chamie (1981) proposed
another approach to overcome the shortcomings of the previous ones: the interac-
tion hypothesis. It is believed to be more consistent with the observed diﬀerentials
and provides a broader conceptual framework with which to understand religious
diﬀerences in fertility. It is believed that religious institutions are a major source
of social exposure through which members of a certain religious group adopt their
religious doctrines and are impacted by other members’ fertility behavior (Zhang,
2008). It implies that fertility behavior cannot be explained solely based on the
membership in a particular religious group but it will depend on the interaction
of the socioeconomic level of the religious group and the local religious and moral
orientations toward procreation and fertility control.
According to Knodel et al. (1999) this hypothesis ignores potentially important
interactions among religions, social change and demographic outcomes. In fact, it
hypothesizes in a reductive manner that all religious groups eventually respond in
a similar manner to the socioeconomic changes associated with the fertility tran-
sition. Also, it does not recognize that doctrinal interpretation by theologians
or local leaders may change in reaction to the same forces that lead to fertility
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transition (Knodel et al., 1999). Despite these shortcomings, recent research is
providing increasing conﬁrmation of this hypothesis, including the work of Ala-
garajan (2003).
Even though I study fertility diﬀerences of groups who share the same religion,
the interaction hypothesis could be relevant considering that there are many re-
ligious subgroups within Judaism and their local orientations may diﬀer more or
less depending on the beliefs of each subgroup as mentioned earlier. Also, it is
possible that socioeconomic characteristics of each subgroup diﬀer.
2.1.2. Socioeconomic diﬀerences in fertility
Fertility is obviously inﬂuenced by a number of factors. As mentioned earlier,
there are direct determinants of fertility such as age at marriage and use of con-
traception among others and what John Bongaarts calls indirect determinants:
socioeconomic factors such as income, education, occupation and religion. This
last factor was largely discussed in the previous section. Because I am interested
in ﬁnding out which factors have a more important inﬂuence on the fertility of
the Jews of Israel and of the West Bank, a review of the role of diﬀerent socioe-
conomic factors on fertility also has to be conducted.
To facilitate the understanding of the role of the diﬀerent socioeconomic factors
on fertility, a review of the microeconomic theory of demand is necessary. Indi-
viduals are rational beings who want to maximize their utility function despite
being confronted by income restraints. “Utility” is an abstract economic concept
used to describe the desire to consume various goods and services as well as the
satisfaction derived from that consumption. Given this measure, one may speak
meaningfully of increasing or decreasing utility, and thereby explain economic
behavior in terms of attempts to increase one’s utility. This theory speciﬁes that
the expenditures of individuals are determined by their choices while trying to
make the best use of their income given budgetary restraints in terms of time and
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opportunity cost7. Given the fact that people’s desires are unlimited and that
the available resources are limited, they have to make choices that allow them to
maximize their income. Having children has a cost and when studying fertility
in an economic context the cost of a child must be considered. Having higher
“quality” children represents a higher cost for each child. A child’s “quality” is
measured in terms of education and well-being.
2.1.2.1. Income
One of the most important socioeconomic variables in the explanation of fer-
tility is income. Indeed the literature highlights that empirical studies on the
subject show that increases in the level of income tend to depress fertility in early
or later stages of life. A study by Kaur (2000) demonstrates that a high monthly
family income reduces the fertility rate by delaying the age at marriage and ele-
vating educational status and the use of family planning devices, thus indicating
a smaller family size.
According to the microeconomic theory of demand, the fertility behavior of a
couple is a function of the family income. Instinctively, a higher income could be
associated with a greater number of children. However, the economist Gary S.
Becker added a principle to the theory according to which the substitution eﬀect8
aﬀects negatively the couple’s fertility behaviour. This theory considers children
as goods. Because children cost a lot of money to their parents (in time, edu-
cation, etc.) parents will consider having less children and more of other goods
that are comparatively cheaper. Also, as it will be mentioned later, Becker argues
that as income increases, parents will invest more in the quality of their children
rather than the quantity.
7The opportunity cost is the next-best choice available to someone who has picked between
several mutually exclusive choices.
8A price change induces a consumer (whose income has remained the same) to buy more
of a relatively lower-priced good and less of a higher-priced one.
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2.1.2.2. Education
Education is another important socioeconomic variable that has an impact
on fertility. Education of women is especially important for fertility because it
is a powerful indicator of the status of women. Gilbert et al. (1982) note that
the traditional view of parenting assumed that the fathers have a minimal role
in the development of their children. For that matter, the education of children
was mostly the responsibility of women. Just like income, education tends to
depress fertility by delaying the age at marriage, fostering a favorable attitude
toward small families and family planning and strengthening the propensity for
women to be in the labor force. Kaur (2000) has observed that the mean fertility
in India decreases as the educational level of the husband or wife moves upward.
He also notes that the education of the wife diminishes the fertility rate in a more
pronounced way than the education of the husband. He concludes his study by
saying that the level of literacy is more eﬀective in controlling the family size than
the level of income.
Still according to the microeconomic theory of demand, a change in the cost
of children will aﬀect on the demand for children. This can be explained by the
change of the opportunity cost of the time of the parents, especially of the mother.
According to Becker the opportunity cost in time of the mother is inﬂuenced by
her education. Indeed, the more she is educated, the more her time is worth
doing other things than taking care of children. In a study about education and
the demand of children, Michael (1973) indicates that educated women have a
lower demand for children. They put the emphasis on the quality of their chil-
dren rather than the quantity. As a matter of fact there seems to be a positive
relationship between the education of the mother and that of her children.
2.1.2.3. Participation in the workforce
Income is closely related to the participation in the workforce. One could
hypothesize that women’s employment status is negatively associated with their
fertility. The birth of a subsequent child raises the amount of unpaid family work.
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A woman with a full time job would have to lower her number of paid work hours
to have another child which would raise the opportunity cost of having that
child. Nahmias and Stecklov (2007) state that a woman’s participation in the
labor force is an important measure of fertility but whose causal relationship is
hard to predict due to potential endogeneity with other socioeconomic variables.
For that matter, the results of many empirical studies on the relationship between
the participation in the work force and the number of children are weak.
2.1.3. Demographic diﬀerences in fertility
Even though demographic characteristics are part of Bongaarts socioeconomic
model, I decided to separate the socioeconomic and demographic factors in this
research for reasons of clarity. Fertility is directly or in some cases indirectly
inﬂuenced by demographic variables and in such projects, these variables are often
used as control variables to ensure that the elements studied are comparable.
2.1.3.1. Age
Age is probably the most obvious and important variable when studying fer-
tility behavior. First of all, women are only fertile during a certain period of their
lives, which is more or less between 15 years of age and 49. The later a woman
starts her reproductive life, the shorter her reproductive period is. She is then
likely to have fewer children than a woman who started earlier. In developed
countries like Israel, the age at ﬁrst birth is very high compared to developing
countries. The age at ﬁrst birth for Jewish women in Israel was 27.92 in 2008 and
24.77 for Jewish women in the West Bank (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2009:
table 3.14).
2.1.3.2. Marital status
Considering that fertility mostly happens within the context of marriage, fer-
tility studies often only consider married individuals in countries that still carry
traditional values like Israel. Just like with age, the later a woman marries, the
less time she is exposed to the risk of having children in a traditional society where
there is little or no fertility out of wedlock. It is important to be careful with
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this variable because it is inﬂuenced by many other variables such as the number
of years spent at school and by professional and personal choices. A study by
Hou et al. (1996) about the fertility of Canadian women shows that women who
married before the age of 20 have a 25.2% (p<0.05) higher likelihood of having a
ﬁrst child than women marrying after age 25. In Israel only, 6% of single women
have children. This phenomenon does not seem to exist in the West Bank (GSS,
2004).
2.1.3.3. Country of birth
In the context of high immigration and relatively low fertility in developed
countries, the role of migrants in overall childbearing patterns in receiving coun-
tries is becoming increasingly important. Immigrants manifest diﬀerent fertility
patterns than their native counterparts which makes the portrait of fertility by
country of birth heterogeneous. As mentioned in the previous chapter, immigra-
tion in Israel comes from various regions with diﬀerent fertility patterns. The
fertility levels in Europe, America and Asia are generally lower than the Israeli
national average. Given the fact that most immigrants to Israel come from these
regions of the world, it should be expected that migration has a negative impact
on the fertility level of the receiving country. However, as seen in ﬁgure 1.5 the
fertility of these immigrants is much closer to the Israeli average than that of
their country of origin whether or not they come from a country with higher or
lower fertility. For that matter, the impact of immigration on fertility in Israel
might be of less importance than in other countries that have a low fertility and
who receive immigrants with high fertility levels.
2.2. Problematique and objectives
This section will establish the relevance of this study and the research objec-
tives. I’ll begin by stating my hypotheses.
2.2.1. Why study fertility diﬀerentials in Israel and the West Bank?
As mentioned earlier the Jewish population of Israel has been comprehen-
sively studied. A lot of researchers have tried to identify the various factors that
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could explain the high level of the Jewish fertility in Israel. Nevertheless in most
of these studies the Jewish population has been studied on a national level even
though the population is very heterogeneous. In this case it is more relevant to
separate the population groups with diﬀerent characteristics in order to make an
analysis that provides results that are closer to the reality of these people. As a
matter of fact, Jews living in the settlements in the West Bank are known to be
more rural, have lower wages and to be more religious than their counterparts in
urban Israeli cities (Israel Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, 2002).
As established earlier, the total fertility rate of the Jews in Israel in 2009 was
2.90 children per woman (all districts of the country including the settlements in
the West Bank). When considering the total fertility rate exclusively of the Jew-
ish population living in the settlements in the West Bank, it increases up to 5.06
children per woman (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2009: table 3.14). Needless to
say that a diﬀerence of over two children per woman is not negligible. It conﬁrms
that the two populations have very diﬀerent attitudes toward fertility and should
be studied separately.
2.2.2. Objectives and question of research
The objective of this exercise is to asses and explain fertility diﬀerentials of
Jewish women living in Israel and the West Bank in the light of the diversity be-
tween these two groups in terms of living conditions. To do that, I will learn about
the mechanisms that explain their fertility by identifying the religious, socioeco-
nomic and demographic factors that aﬀect on their diﬀerent fertility patterns. To
reach these goals, here are a few questions I will try to answer in the next chapters:
(1) In what way is the fertility behavior of the Jews living in Israel diﬀerent
from that of the Jews living in settlements of the West Bank?
(2) What factors best explain the fertility diﬀerences of these two groups? Are
better fertility diﬀerences mostly related to socioeconomic, demographic
or religious variables?
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(3) Does the impact of these variables is of similar importance in Israel and
the West Bank?
With all the information gathered about the fertility behavior of the Jewish people
in the literature review and the theoretical framework, it is relevant to hypothe-
size that the fertility behavior of the Jews living in Israel and of those living in
the West Bank are similar in many points, i.e., they are both impacted by a series
of socioeconomic factors. However, it might diﬀer in the way that their fertility
is inﬂuenced by religiosity and by some demographic variables.
The lower fertility of the Jews living in Israel might be partly due to the fact
that they marry later and hence have a shorter reproductive life than the Jew-
ish women living in the settlements. I also hypothesize that they marry later
because they live in more urban areas, study longer and have higher paying
jobs which keeps them on the employment market all throughout their reproduc-
tive lives. Finally, I hypothesize that Israeli Jews’ lower fertility is due to the fact
that Jews living in Israel are less religious than Jews living in the West Bank.
All religious, socioeconomic and demographic variables aﬀect fertility in both
regions but I hypothesize that the impact of religiosity in maintaining a high fer-
tility is less important than the socioeconomic factors mentioned above. However
the impact of religiosity is most likely to be stronger in the settlements in the
West Bank than in the rest of Israel considering the high percentage of religious
people in the region.
Despite the fact that the General Social Survey provides a limited set of variables
other than on socioeconomic, demographic and religious variables, it is most likely
that I will be able to measure a signiﬁcant impact of these variables to explain
the fertility of the two groups. Other variables not measured in the survey or
that are not measurable probably also intervene on fertility, e.g., political views,
nationalism, personal aspirations, etc.
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I will also compare my results to those of Anson and Meir (1996) in their study
on nationalism in Israel 9 in which they argue that when controling for all other
variables, the impact of religiosity on fertility is not signiﬁcant. They conclude by
saying that the statistical association between fertility and religiosity is incorect
and that the religiosity measured in surveys is an expression of a deep nationalist
sentiment.
9Article entitled: “Religiosity, Nationalism and Fertility in Israel”.
Chapter 3
DATA AND METHODS
The theoretical framework elaborated in chapter 2 illustrates in the most holistic
way as possible the many factors that have an impact on female fertility and
the theories that have resulted from studies of fertility. The main objective of
chapter 3 is to give a proper description of the data available for this project and,
consequently, of the most appropriate methodology to use for the analysis of the
data.
3.1. Data
3.1.1. Origin of the data
The most complete source of information on fertility behavior as well as re-
ligious, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in Israel is the General
Social Survey (GSS). This survey has been conducted annually since 2002. Its
main purpose is to provide up-to-date information on the welfare of the de jure
population of Israel and on their living conditions. The 2004 edition will be used
in this research. The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) has made the full
edition available for this project.
The questionnaire contains two parts: a core questionnaire containing about 100
items covering the main areas of life such as health, housing, employment, eco-
nomic situation, etc. and a variable module devoted to a diﬀerent topic every year
in order to investigate in greater details a certain aspect of life in Israel that cannot
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be addressed by the core questionnaire. In 2004 the variable module was on non-
compulsory educational framework for children aged 0-13 and their connection
with parent’s employment. This will not be used in the present research. With
questions about religious beliefs and religiosity, income, education, participation
in the workforce, age, country of birth, marital status, number of children and
region of residence, it will be possible to assess the importance of each factor with
respect to fertility behavior of Jewish women in Israel and the West Bank in 2004.
The questionnaires of the GSS are administered by interviewers of the ICBS
using laptops to conduct computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI) based on
Blaise software developed by Statistics Netherlands. The interviews have been
conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian and they lasted for about an hour.
The survey population comprises the permanent non-institutional population of
Israel aged 20 and older, as well as residents of non-custodial institutions. New
immigrants are included in the survey population if they have been present in
Israel for at least six months. The population excluded from the survey include
Israelis abroad for more than a year without interruption at the time of the survey,
diplomats, Bedouins and other persons living outside the boundaries of localities.
The Population Registry has been used as a sampling frame.
The desired ﬁnal sample size was 7,200 persons aged 20 and older. The ﬁrst
stage of sample design involved deﬁning groups based on combination of three
demographic variables:
(1) Five population groups: Arabs in East Jerusalem, outside of East Jerusalem,
immigrants who arrived in 1990 or later, immigrants who arrived by 1989
and Israeli-born Jews;
(2) Seven age groups: 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74 and 75+;
(3) Men and women.
The expected size of each design group was to be proportional to its size in the
population under the constraint of a ﬁnal sample of 7,200 completed interviews.
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In some of the design groups, the sample size of parents of children aged 0 to 13
has been oversampled in order to increase the potential number of respondents in
the variable module. In the ﬁnal analysis, the boosting increased the percentage
of parents of 0 to 13 year olds to 34% of the sample.
The ﬁnal sampling probability for each person varies by design group and some-
times even within a design group and reﬂects a-priori assumptions regarding the
proportion of non-response for each group. The average sampling probability was
1:485, the maximum sampling probability was 1:305, and the minimal sampling
probability was 1:920.
Persons listed in localities from which it was expected to obtain sample sizes
of at least 15 persons were sampled in a single-stage stratiﬁed sample, with each
design group comprising a stratum. A systematic random sample of persons was
drawn from each stratum after it was arranged according to the geographic char-
acteristics of the localities it contained. Altogether, about 83% of the sample was
drawn in single-stage sampling. Because of practical constraints, localities having
fewer than 7,400 listed residents aged 20 or older were sampled in a two-stage
procedure.
Table 3.1. Results for the ﬁeldwork for the 2004 GSS of Israel
2004 Absolute numbers Percentages (%)
Total sampled 9,528 100
Included 9,008 94.5
Exclused 520 5.5
Thereof:
Deceased 119 1.2
Abroad for over a year 296 3.1
Institution 70 0.7
Other (living outside the localities) 35 0.4
Responded 7,616 84.5
Did not respond 1,392 15.5
Source: Social Survey Table Generator Help, ICBS, 2004
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It is important to keep in mind that the data in table 3.1 contains all the respo-
dents to the survey regardless of their religion. Because this research only focusses
on the female Jewish population of Israel, all the non Jewish respondents were
removed from the sample as well as male respondents. For that matter, more
information on how to deﬁne a Jewish person is necessary. Deﬁning who belongs
to the Jewry on the basis of conceptual or normative criteria is not an easy task.
In Israel, personal Jewish status is subject to the rulings of the Ministry of the
Interior, which relies on criteria established by rabbinic authorities and by the
Israeli Supreme Court. In this way, the core Jewish population1 does not simply
express subjective identiﬁcation as elsewhere in the world but reﬂects deﬁnite
legal rules. It entails matrilinear Jewish origin, or conversion to Judaism, and
not holding another religion (DellaPergola, 2010)
3.1.2. Limits of the data
The sampling frame of this survey is the Population Registry. The quality
of the sampling frame depends on the degree to which it covers the survey pop-
ulation. Unfortunately, the Population Registry suﬀers from undercoverage of
tourists and temporary residents living in Israel for more than a year (Israel Cen-
tral Bureau of Statistics, 2004b). They should have been included in the survey,
but in practical terms, were not. Undercoverage can lead to biased estimates.
Fortunately, the extent of undercoverage is minimal in this survey.
Another issue related to the use of the Population Registry is the fact that about
500,000 persons (Kamen, 2005) no longer live in Israel but are still listed in the
Registry. Such persons represent about 7% of the total number of people listed
in the Registry. The General Social Survey excludes individuals who have been
abroad for over a year but the overcoverage of emigrants who should not have
been counted in the Registry aﬀects the survey sample.
1All persons who, when asked in a socio-demographic survey, identify themselves as Jews;
or who are identiﬁed as Jews by a respondent in the same household, and do not have another
monotheistic religion (Kosmin et al., 1991).
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One last problem with the use of the Population Registry is related to the fact
that it completely misses an important group. Indeed the Population Registry
misses those people without an Israeli ID number2, whether they are in the coun-
try legally or illegally. These people are not considered in the survey and may
represent individuals with characteristics that diﬀer from the rest of the popula-
tion. Certain types of people might have been left out of the survey and are not
represented in the sample.
There is also a selection bias because the survey only represents the people who
avoided a certain number of disruptive events such as migration or death at the
time of the interview. The elderly cohorts and the groups heavily touched by
immigration are not as well represented as the other groups. Most of the time,
this bias is considered to be negligible at the time of the analysis. Still, it is
important to mention it because in a study of fertility, the most active groups are
the young professionals who are amongst the most touched by migration (pro-
fessional migration). As for the elderly, it is of lesser importance because they
represent a small amount of the population given the fact that the Israeli society is
rather young. Also, in this project, I focus on individuals aged between 20 and 54.
I am using survey data to study fertility diﬀerentials between two population
groups: Jews living in Israel and Jews living in the West Bank. There are ob-
viously a very small number of Jews living in the West Bank compared to all
of those living in all of the remaining regions of Israel. Indeed, in 2008, 5,1%
(284,100 thousand people) of all the Jews of Israel that were living in the West
Bank (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2009: table 2.6). In this situation, survey
data is not the ideal source of information for this kind of research because I have
to deal with small numbers for the residents of the West Bank (90 observations).
Having to deal with this situation, I must take into consideration the fact that the
results will have less precision and bigger conﬁdence intervals. This limit will be
2An Identity Number is issued to all Israeli citizens at birth by the Ministry of the Interior.
Temporary residents are assigned a number when they receive temporary resident status.
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considered throughout the analysis of the results. If I had designed a survey for
the speciﬁc purpose of this research, I would have oversampled the respondents
of the West Bank to have more reliable data. Aso, given the small number of
observations, it is diﬃcult to test for interaction between the independent vari-
ables. For that matter, there could be a relationship between two independent
variables such as age and duration of mariage or work status and family income,
which could result in under-estimating the eﬀect of these variables on the out-
come of interest, the number of children ever born. We must always keep these
possible interactions between the independent variables in mind when looking at
the results.
3.1.3. Evaluating the quality of the data
Comparing some variables of the General Social Survey of Israel with the
corresponding variables in the Census data of Israel can help evaluate how close
the data of the survey is to the actual population to assure that the results of the
research will adequately represent the total population of Israel. The data from
the General Social Survey of 2004 have been compared to the data from the most
accurate source of information on Israeli individuals, that is the 1995 Census. The
changes that occurred in the population after the Census are corrected yearly with
the information in the Population Registry. For the comparison, the most recent
estimates used were for 2004.
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Table 3.2. Age distribution (%) of the Israeli females aged 20
and over observed in the General Social Survey of 2004 and in the
Population Registry
GSS 2004 Population Registry Diﬀerence (%)
20-24 years 11.42 12.77 10.57
25-29 years 12.13 12.63 3.96
30-34 years 11.82 11.38 3.87
35-44 years 20.06 18.44 8.79
45-54 years 18.20 17.26 5.45
55-64 years 11.02 11.83 6.85
65-74 years 7.97 8.56 6.89
75 + years 7.37 7.12 3.51
Mean age 46.64 46.72 0.17
Source: General Social Survey of Israel, 2004 and Population Registry, ICBS, 2004
Table 3.2 shows that the observed age distribution of the female individuals
in Israel in the 2004 GSS are commensurate with that in the 1995 Census. As
expected, the oldest and youngest age groups are harder to represent. The women
aged 25-59, have relative distances of approximately 5%, which is not very im-
portant. This overestimation can be accounted for the fact that the Population
Registry wasn’t properly adjusted at the time of the survey and that this age
group is very mobile (migrations for work) and are hard to track properly. As for
the three oldest population groups with the biggest diﬀerence from the Census
data, the lack of precision is not an issue because the oldest population group
that will be used in this projet is people aged up to 54. Finally, when comparing
the mean age of women aged 20 and over from the survey data and from the
Population Registry there is a very small diﬀerence, which assures us that the
survey data is reliable.
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3.2. Methodology
The data available with the General Social Survey of Israel provides informa-
tion about the fertility of its people in 2004 and of their socioeconomic, demo-
graphic and religious characteristics for that year. Because it is a cross-sectional
survey with a limited set of questions on fertility the types of analyses that can be
conducted to develop a better understanding of fertility behavior in Israel and the
West Bank are limited. There is however enough information to produce some
interesting results that can be analysed and thus help answer the questions asked
in the ﬁrst chapter.
I will ﬁrst start by describing the outcome of interest: the number of children
ever born. After that I will determine what is the best methodology to use with
this type of variable. Finally, a brief description of the explanatory variables
chosen for this project will be done.
3.2.1. Outcome of interest: number of children ever born
Because fertility is the main subject of this thesis, the dependent variable used
to measure this phenomenon will be the number of children ever born (CEB) to
all female respondents aged 20 to 54. Women older than 54 were dropped from
the sample to limit a biais caused by generational diﬀerences. The data available
in the General Social Survey of Israel (2004) allows us to measure the CEB with
these two questions: “Have you given birth to children?” and “How many children
have you given birth to (including children not living today)?”. With these two
questions, one derived variable is created that identiﬁes the number of children
ever born to all women in the survey. The answers are given in the form of a
count variable ranging from 0 to 7 children ever born per woman.
Manual X (1983) deﬁnes the number of children ever born to a particular woman
as an aggregate measure of her lifetime fertility experience up to the moment the
data are being collected. This data conveys no information about timing, whether
on a personal scale, such as age or duration of marriage, or on an external scale,
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such as calendar years.
It also reports the main strength of data on children ever born. No dating is
involved so that the data cannot be distorted by dating errors. Some weaknesses
of such data have also been reported. First, the fact that the information is
collected in the form of numbers can induce greater errors than is information de-
rived from questions that require a simple “yes” or “no” answer. Another problem
with this kind of data is related to omission. Women tend to omit mentioning
some live-born children who do not live in their household and those who have
died. It has been noticed that this kind of omission tends to increase with the age
of the mother. Inversely, some mothers include stillbirths and late foetal deaths
among live-born children. This kind of declaration is rather rare but it should
be stressed to include only live-born children. Finally, this data doesn’t consider
the eﬀects of mortality and migration on women fertility. While the ﬁrst one is
rather negligible, it has to be considered when comparing diﬀerent generations
of women who may have experienced diﬀerent mortality levels. The second one
could be more serious than mortality on a subnational level. Indeed, if fertility
is inﬂuenced by the place of residence, data classiﬁed by place of birth wouldn’t
represent adequately the current region fertility diﬀerentials that are of greatest
interest.
Despite such shortcomings, data collected on the number of children ever born is
still widely used since it is one of the most widely available sources of information
on fertility in cross-sectional surveys.
3.2.2. Choice and description of the methods
With basic descriptive statistics for each independent variable available, I will
be able to see which variables have a diﬀerent impact from one region to the other.
This will help to evaluate which variables play a role in explaining the diﬀerences.
I will then use a log-linear model to produce Poisson regressions to analyze the
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diﬀerences in the number of children ever born between Jewish women living in
Israel and the West Bank.
3.2.2.1. Poisson regression
To determine the inﬂuence of a certain number of individual characteristics
and behaviors on the outcome of interest, I will use a multivariate regression
analysis. Speciﬁcally because the outcome of interest is a count variable, Poisson
regression is the most appropriate procedure used to conduct this analysis. When
the dependant variable is a count like the number of children ever born, it is often
heavily skewed with a long right tail (the right tail can be seen in ﬁgure 3.1). 3
Figure 3.1. Distribution of the number of children per Jewish
woman in Israel and the West Bank, 2004
Source: Data combined from the General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
Such a tail is usually especially visible in low fertility populations because of
the observed distribution of data with a low mean, which is due to the fact that
many women desire few children and very few women want many children. The
Poisson model is then superior to ordinary least squares (OLS) or other linear
models. Long and Freese (2006) warn us about linear models by saying that the
3Both samples do not exactly follow a normal distribution because it underestimates or
overestimates the number of observations in some categories. However, by looking at the kur-
tosis of each sample (3.28 for Israel and 2.64 for the West Bank) we can assume that it is
very close to a normal distribution. Indeed, a normal random distribution has a kurtosis of 3
irrespective of its mean or standard deviation.
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use of a linear regression model to count outcomes is not appropriate and could
cause “ineﬃcient, inconsistent, and biased estimates”.
The Poisson regression is a particular case of the generalized linear model in
which the conditional distribution of the dependant variable follows a Poisson
law and the link function is logarithmic. Poisson regression estimates the eﬀects
of explanatory variables on rates. The logarithmic form of the model is such that
the exponents of the regression coeﬃcients represent the relationships between
the fertility rates of diﬀerent groups of women (Schoumaker, 2004).
In this study, the dependent variable is the number of children (yi) per woman
(i). The probability that the random variable Yi is equal to yi is assumed to
follow a Poisson distribution with mean μi:
P (Yi = yi|μi) = e
μiμyi
yi!
(3.2.1)
The mean number of births (μi) can be decomposed into the product of a fertility
rate (λi) and a length of exposure (ti):
μi = tiλi (3.2.2)
The logarithm of the mean (μi) is equal to the sum of the logarithms of the
lengths of exposure (ti) and the fertility rate (λi):
lnμi = ln ti + lnλi (3.2.3)
The logarithm of the length of exposure is the oﬀset, and the logarithm of the
fertility rates is modeled as a linear function of k explanatory variables:
lnλi =
K∑
k=1
βkxki (3.2.4)
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From which:
lnμi = ln ti +
K∑
k=1
βkxki (3.2.5)
By exponentiating equation 4, we see that the explanatory variables have multi-
plicative eﬀects on the rate (λi), since:
λi = exp
K∑
k=1
βkxki =
K∏
k=1
exp(βkxki) (3.2.6)
The exponent of the regression coeﬃcient (βk) for an explanatory variable (xk)
expresses the relationship between the fertility rate of women for which the ex-
planatory variable has a given value and the fertility rate of women for which the
variable has that value minus one, all other things being equal. For example, for
a dichotomous variable, the exponent of the coeﬃcient of this variable is equal to
the ratio of the fertility rate of women in a category to the fertility rate of women
in the reference category (Schoumaker, 2004).
3.2.3. Independent variables
The use of a series of independent variables is essential to a comprehensive
socioeconomic, religious and demographic study of fertility. The following in-
dependent variables were chosen using the existing literature on the subject in
order to test the hypotheses mentioned in the ﬁrst chapter. These independent
variables were created with the available information given out by the General
Social Survey of Israel of 2004.
When conducting such a study on fertility behavior, it is important to always
take into account the economic and political context of the region where the
study is being conducted. In the previous chapters, it has been shown how the
economic and political climate of a country can aﬀect people’s choices and indi-
vidual behaviors regarding fertility. Contrary to economic prosperity or certain
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pro-natalist family policies, a slowdown in economic activity may temporarily
reduce fertility through the inﬂuence of the purchasing power of individuals and
the perceived value of consumer goods (Ducharme, 2001).
3.2.3.1. Religious variables
(1) Religiosity
Among the many explanatory variables of the fertility diﬀerentials, re-
ligiosity is a rather important one. Indeed, Lehrer (1996) noted that
the relationship between religion and fertility is generally mediated by
religiosity. As mentioned earlier strong religiosity is usually marked by
strong daily inﬂuence of religious beliefs on individual decisions and fre-
quent participation in religious activities (Zhang, 2008). Marchena and
Waite (2000) observed that religious participation among young people is
strongly linked to more positive attitudes towards marriage and having
children.
Religiosity is measured by one variable: “Do you consider yourself as be-
ing: ... ultra-religious (“haredi”), ... religious, ... traditional but religious,
... traditional but not so religious, ... non religious (secular)?” This vari-
able has been reclassiﬁed as a set of three dummy variables: “religious”,
“traditional” 4 or “non-religious”. Note that only people who answered the
question have been included (9 observations have been dropped for not
providing a response).
It would be ideal to have information about the respondents’ religios-
ity all throughout their lives to be able to evaluate if changes in religiosity
4A traditional Jew will observe a certain amount of “light” and “heavier” commandments
such as attending synagogue on the High Holidays, fasting on Yom Kippur, keeping a Kosher
kitchen or avoiding any work (including using a car) on Saturdays (Shmueli, 2006).
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impact the number of children a woman is bound to have during her repro-
ductive life. Unfortunately this information is not available in the survey.
3.2.3.2. Socioeconomic variables
(1) Family income
As shown in the second chapter, there is a relationship between the house-
hold income and fertility. It is in fact one of the most important socioe-
conomic variables in the explanation of fertility.
The General Social Survey of Israel contains information about both the
individual and the household monthly income. However, an individual’s
income is closely related to his/her education and since education is also
an important socioeconomic variable, using this variable could create mul-
ticollinearity 5 in the Poisson regression. There is also a number of women
who do not do paid work but take care of their children during the day.
These women rely on somebody else’s income. By using the individ-
ual’s gross monthly income, these women would be categorized as “living
without any income”, which would be misleading. For that matter, the
household income will be used instead of the individual income.
The question: “Last month, what was the total gross income of all mem-
bers of the household, from all sources: work, pensions, support payments,
rents, etc.?” was used. Given the fact that the gross monthly income of
households in Israel was of 11, 220 NIS (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics,
2004a) in 2004 (more or less 3,000 CAD) and the fact that the variable
had already been categorized a certain way, a set of two dummy variables
has been created: “10,000 NIS or less” and “10,001 NIS or more”.
5Multicollinearity is a statistical phenomenon in which two or more predictor variables
in a multiple regression model are highly correlated. The coeﬃcient estimates may change
inconsistently in response to small changes.
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Because the number of respondents in the West Bank is small, I had
to make broad categorizations for many variables in order to have enough
observations in each category. This will also be done for some of the other
variables.
(2) Education
The level of education is one of the most largely used indicators to mea-
sure socioeconomic disparities. Education level is often used as a deter-
minant of women’s salary to estimate the eﬀect of the opportunity cost
of a woman’s time on her fertility. Considering the opportunity cost of
her time, high education should have a negative impact on fertility. Rais-
ing children requires a lot of a mother’s time that could be used making
money. This relationship has been widely studied in the literature. Also,
a woman’s education is more frequently used to evaluate fertility because
the impact of a man’s education is not as clear. Most studies on fertility
don’t consider the man’s education.
The questions in the GSS allow to trace the respondent’s level of edu-
cation easily with the question: “What is the highest education certiﬁcate
or degree that you have received?” Respondents can answer from ele-
mentary or middle school up to the obtention of a PhD. Once again,
because of the small amount of observations in the West Bank, three
variables have been created: “secondary school diploma or less”, “post sec-
ondary non-academic diploma” and “university degree”. The “secondary
school diploma or less” category includes respondents who do not have any
diploma, have completed elementary or middle school or have completed
secondary school. The “post secondary non-academic diploma” category
includes respondents who have received their baccalaureate certiﬁcate, or
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a post-secondary, non-academic certiﬁcate. The “university degree” cat-
egory includes respondents who have received a certiﬁcate, a bachelor
degree, a master’s degree or a PhD.
(3) Participation in the workforce
Participating in the workforce (being employed at a job or business or
not) is another interesting socioeconomic variable for two major reasons.
First, because a lot of people are reluctant to give out information about
their income in surveys and censuses but information about their partic-
ipation in the workforce can be a way to get more information on these
people. It is a good complement to the variable about income. This vari-
able is also interesting when studying women because it allows to evaluate
their commitment toward the job market and consequently, the opportu-
nity cost of their time if they had to leave the workforce, let’s say, because
of a pregnancy.
Many studies tend to show that there is a real link between a woman’s
participation in the workforce and her fertility level. This relationship is
not surprisingly negative. An additional birth increases the amount of
unpaid work and decreases the amount of time for other activities such as
being active in the workforce. To explore whether this variable has a sig-
niﬁcant impact on Israeli women’s fertility, I created a variable indicating
whether a woman is working at a job or business or not. The variable has
been derived from the question: “Which of the following best describes
your main activity during the past 12 months?” From this question, two
dummy variables have been produced: “currently working at a job or busi-
ness” and “not currently” working at a job or business”.
This variable does not allow us to trace a woman’s entire professional
curriculum but can indicate whether or not she has been taking care of
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children instead of working in the past year.
3.2.3.3. Demographic variables
(1) Country of origin
Studies have shown that there are many demographic variables that play
an important role in the explanation of fertility. One of these variables is
the country of origin. Indeed, as it has been mentioned in the previous
chapters, individuals do not experience the same fertility trends depending
on where they have been born and/or raised. A study by Caron-Malenfant
and Bélanger (2006) has put foward the hypothesis that the fertility of
immigrants in Canada is higher during the ﬁrst years following immigra-
tion and tends to reach the fertility of native Canadian over the years. An
individual coming from a country where fertility levels are high is more
exposed to the risk of having a high fertility than an individual coming
from a country where the fertility is low. For that matter, the coun-
try of origin can be considered a good indicator of the cultural variation
observed between the diﬀerent ethnic groups of the study population. Fig-
ure 1.5 has shown that the immigrants have a fertility behavior that diﬀers
from that of their country of origin and that of Israel. than the natives
in Israel. For that reason the fertility of the country is very heterogeneous.
The data collected in the GSS provide information about the country of
origin of the respondents. The questionnaire asks: “Country of birth (ac-
cording to current boundaries)”. The possible answers to this questions in
the questionnaire are: Israel, Europe-America, Asia or Africa. From this
questions, two dummy variables have been created: “Israel” and “abroad”.
This variable will allow us to evaluate if the fact of being an immigrant
in Israel has a signiﬁcant impact on the fertility of these women and its
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extent, if any.
(2) Age
Many demographic variables are used as control variables because they
inﬂuence fertility, such as age. Women do not have the same fertility lev-
els depending on their age. Indeed, women who have had their ﬁrst child
at a young age are most likely to have subsequent births than a woman
who started later. For the analysis, I have kept all women aged 20 to 54
for the reasons mentioned in the beginning of the chapter.
(3) Marital status
The variable “marital status” is rather important in studying fertility. In-
deed, one of the main objectives of marriage is starting a family. For that
matter, a married woman will more likely have more children than a single
woman especially in a Jewih society where religion is still important for a
large part of the population. It has however been noted in the database
that a certain amount of women that were not married had children. Also,
by only considering married women, we would not be able to measure the
fertility of separated, divorced and widowed women. For this reason, it
has been decided not to limit the study population to married women.
The dynamics between the formation of marital unions and fertility has
largely been transformed in the past decades. With the generalization of
the use of contraception, the rise of divorce and of common-law unions
among younger generations, fertility can no longer be restricted to married
couples. Although marriage is still one of the most stable types of unions,
women can chose other avenues to have their families. In the GSS ques-
tionnaire, respondents were being asked: “For persons 15 years or older,
are you: ... married, ... separated, ... divorced, ... widowed or ... single?”
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People who answered being married or separated were asked the number
of years of their marriage. With these possible answers, a variable with
the possible labels as follow was created: “not married or married in the
past year”, “married for 2 to 10 years” and “married for 11 years or more”.
(4) Region of residence
A variable “region of residence” has been created from the information
about the respondents addresses. This variable will be used to separate
the Jewish people who live in the settlements of the West Bank from the
ones who live in the other regions of Israel.
As mentioned in the previous chapters, people residing in the settlements
beneﬁt of many incentives that people living elsewhere do not have ac-
cess to. This will help evaluate if their higher fertility is mostly due to
these socioeconomic incentives, their demographic characteristics or their
religiosity.
3.2.4. Background characteristics of women interviewed in
the 2004 General Social survey
The data from table 3.3 provides information about the variables in the
way they were categorized for the explanatory analysis with the exception
of age that has been categorized to give an idea of the age distribution.
The variable is continuous in the analysis.
The next table will present a few of the basic characteristics of the re-
spondents to have an idea of their proﬁle and a preview of the similarities
and diﬀerences in the two regions.
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Table 3.3. Demographic, socio-economic and religious character-
istics of Jewish women
Characteristics Israel West Bank
(%) (%)
Age groups 20-24 16.1 12.2
25-39 47.0 51.1
40 and over 36.9 36.7
Religiosity Not religious 46.6 26.7
Traditional 36.6 18.9
Religious 16.8 54.5
Education Secondary or less 23.0 17.8
Post secondary 48.2 51.1
University degree 28.8 31.1
Work status Is currently working 65.0 64.4
Is not currently working 35.0 35.6
Monthly family income 10,000 NIS or less 67.9 67.8
10,001 NIS or more 32.1 32.2
Country of birth Israel 72.6 75.6
Abroad 27.4 24.4
Years married Not married or less than a year 37.9 15.6
2-10 years 23.6 34.4
11 years or more 38.5 50.0
N 2,099 90
Source: Our calculations from the General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
With the information provided in table 3.3 it is possible to see that the age
distribution is roughly similar in both regions. Almost 40% of all women
in the study population are 40 years old and over. There are a little more
young women in Israel than in the West Bank (16% vs. 12%). Because an
important part of the women in the survey are over 40, I can assume that
they have ﬁnished or almost ﬁnished their reproductive lives. Despite the
fact that the dominant age group in both regions is women aged 25 to 39,
an important proportion of women is not married or has been married in
the past year; 38% in Israel and 16% in the West Bank. More women in
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the West Bank have been married for a long time: around 35% of them
had been married for 2 to 10 years and 50% for over 10 years compared
to 24% and 39% in Israel.
Figure 3.2. Age speciﬁc fertility rates in Israel and the West
Bank, 2004
Source: Our calculations from the General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
Figure 3.2 clearly shows the diﬀerent age speciﬁc fertility patterns of
women from Israel and the West Bank. Indeed, women in the West Bank
start their reproductive life much younger than in Israel and reach higher
fertility rates. The fact that they start having children early allows them
to have a longer reproductive life which entails them to have more children
throughout their lives.
The table also shows that in both regions, about 30% of women have a
university degree and half of the female population has a post secondary
non-academic certiﬁcate. Figure 3.3 shows that there exists a relationship
between education and the mean number of children in Israel but it is not
as clear in the West Bank. As far as their level of education goes upwards,
they tend to have fewer children. In fact, women with a secondary school
diploma or less have a higher mean number of children than women with a
post secondary non-academic diploma and women with a university degree
but the relationship is not as clear between women with a post secondary
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non-academic diploma and women with a university degree. For the same
level of education, Jewish women in the West Bank have more children
than their counterparts in Israel.
Figure 3.3. Number of children per woman by the highest level
of education attained in Israel and the West Bank, 2004
Source: Our calculations from the General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
Almost 70% of all women declared having a gross family income inferior
to 10,000 NIS per month, which represents less than 2,800$ CAN. The
relationship between the number of children and the gross monthly family
income shown in ﬁgure 3.4 does not appear to go in the direction pre-
dicted in the theory. The families of both regions have been separated
into two categories according to whether their income is below or above
the average wage in the country. It seems as if families with higher in-
come have more children than families with lower incomes in both regions.
However the diﬀerence appears to be stronger in the West Bank than in
Israel. The analyses that will be conducted in the fourth chapter will tell
if the relationship between income and the number of children in Israel is
signiﬁcant or not.
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Figure 3.4. Mean number of children per woman and the gross
family income per month in Israel and the West Bank, 2004
Source: Our calculations from the General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
The survey data shown in table 3.3 shows that there are about the same
amount of employed women in both regions (about 65% of them are cur-
rently working). Women working at a paid job or business in Israel have
slightly more children than women who do not as shown in ﬁgure 3.5. The
diﬀerence is very small but in the opposite direction than that expected.
In the West Bank it is the other way around. Women not working have
more children than women working at a paid job. The ﬁgure also shows
that whether they have a paid job or not, women in the West Bank have
more children than their counterparts in Israel.
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Figure 3.5. Number of children per woman by labour force status
in Israel and the West Bank, 2004
Source: Our calculations from the General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
It is interesting to note that the socioeconomic variables presented here
for Israel and the West Bank show tendencies that go against the theory
presented in chapter 2. Indeed, variables like income, education and work
status usually have a negative association with fertility. It is said that the
fact of having a higher income, being highly educated and/or working at
a job or business decreases fertility. However the relationships are not as
clear in both regions. More often than not, when respondents have char-
acteristics that are normally associated with lower fertility at an inferior
scale, their fertility is equal or higher. This situation might reﬂect the
importance of having children in the Jewish culture and the success of the
country’s fertility policies. The analyses in the fourth chapter will tell if
these surprising relationships are signiﬁcant or not.
The diﬀerences between the two regions become more obvious when it
comes to the religious variable. Indeed, religiosity varies a lot. One quar-
ter of the women in the West Bank declared not being religious as opposed
to 50% of the women in Israel. 19% of the women of the West Bank and
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37% of the women in Israel declared being traditional. The diﬀerence is
even more apparent among religious people. 17% of the women in Israel
are religious as as opposed to 55% in the West Bank. This clearly is the
variable that changes the most from one region to the other.
Figure 3.6. Number of children per woman by religiosity in Israel
and the West Bank, 2004
Source: Our calculations from the General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
Figure 3.6 shows a clear relationship between religiosity and the number
of children. Religious women follow the traditional values associated with
their religion no matter what their region of residence is. In this sense, the
eﬀect of the religious doctrines is larger among the more religious people
because they are more likely to be inﬂuenced by the religious teachings.
Even the non-religious and traditional women of the West Bank have more
children than their counterparts in the rest of Israel.
To sum up, despite the fact that the respondents live in two diﬀerent
regions, most of their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are
similar. The main diﬀerence relies in their religiosity. Because of this big
diﬀerence, it could be tempting to assume that this is the main reason for
their diﬀerent fertility behavior. The next chapter will allows us to verify
if the relationships just found are signiﬁcant or not and to determine the
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amplitude of their impact on Jewish fertility in Israel and the West Bank.
Chapter 4
DESCRIPTIVE AND EXPLANATORY
ANALYSIS
The ﬁrst part of this chapter will be dedicated to the descriptive analysis.
In this section, the religious, socioeconomic and demographic character-
istics of each group will be compared to see where diﬀerences can be ob-
served between the two groups. Once these diﬀerences in terms of children
ever born are highlighted, I will proceed to the explanatory analysis that
will provide more information as to which variables inﬂuence the fertility
behaviour of the women of Israel and the West Bank and to what extent
they have an impact.
4.1. Descriptive analysis
4.1.1. Bivariate analysis
As seen in the introduction the mean number of children ever born among
Jewish women aged 20 to 54 in Israel is 1.88 and 2.84 in the West Bank.
There is a series of religious, socioeconomic and demographic variables
that interfere with the number of children ever born (CEB).
I have analysed the mean number of children ever born for each category
of the independent variables in both regions to examine the association
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between children ever born and women’s religious, socioeconomic and de-
mographic characteristics.
Table 4.1. Mean number of children ever born to Jewish women
by demographic, socio-economic and religious characteristics
Israel West Bank
Characteristics Mean CEB SD F-Value Mean CEB SD F-Value
Age group 20-24 0.19 0.61 1001.48*** 0.36 0.67 37.89***
25-39 1.65 1.52 2.59 1.64
40 and over 2.91 1.57 4.03 1.82
Religiosity Not religious 1.42 1.32 250.16*** 2.38 0.97 3.07
Traditional 1.91 1.49 2.53 1.70
Religious 3.07 2.40 3.18 2.37
Education Secondary or less 2.40 1.81 31.18*** 3.38 2.16 0.03
Post secondary 1.69 1.76 2.52 1.79
University degree 1.78 1.45 3.07 2.16
Work status Is currently working 1.93 1.55 3.56 2.74 1.90 0.44
Is not currently working 1.78 1.97 3.03 2.15
Monthly family income 10,000 NIS or less 1.84 1.82 1.81 2.72 2.07 0.73
10,001 NIS or more 1.95 1.44 3.10 1.80
Country of birth Israel 1.82 1.74 5.40* 2.74 1.94 0.84
Abroad 2.02 1.62 3.18 2.13
Years married Not married or less than a year 0.63 1.13 1652.98*** 1.43 1.95 35.66***
2-10 years 1.67 1.17 1.87 1.38
11 years or more 3.23 1.45 3.96 1.72
N 2,099 90
Source: Our calculations from the General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
4.1.1.1. Israel
In Israel, women barely start their reproductive lives before 25. Indeed,
the mean CEB for women aged 20-24 is 0.19. Women aged 40 and up
have a signiﬁcantly higher CEB than women aged 25-39. They have
about one more child. Religiosity also has a signiﬁcant impact. Reli-
gious women have about twice the CEB than do non-religious women
(3.07 vs. 1.42). They also have about one more CEB than traditional
women (1.91). Women who went to university have a signiﬁcantly lower
number of CEB than women who stopped after secondary school (1.78
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vs. 2.40). However, women with a post secondary non-academic certiﬁ-
cate appear to have about the same number of children (1.69). Women
born abroad also have signiﬁcantly more CEB than native Israelis (2.02
vs. 1.82). There is a signiﬁcant increase in the mean number of CEB
throughout the years of marriage. Indeed, women who have been mar-
ried for over 10 years (3.23) have ﬁve times more CEB than those not
married or married for less than a year (0.63). They also have twice as
many children as women who have been married for 2 to 10 years (1.67).
Considering that the longer the duration of a marriage is, the older the
woman gets, this results is in the normal order of things. Finally, being
employed and having a higher monthly family income appear to have a
positive impact on the mean CEB but the results are not signiﬁcant.
4.1.1.2. West Bank
The situation is similar in the West Bank but ampliﬁed for many variables.
Indeed, women seem to start their reproductive lives a little earlier than
their counterparts in Israel. They already have 0.36 CEB before the age
of 25 and the CEB increases signiﬁcantly with age. Women aged 25-
39 already have a mean CEB of 2.59 and those aged 40 and up have a
mean CEB of 4.06. At this age, it represents 1.12 more CEB than in
Israel. Religious women also have a higher mean number of CEB than
non-religious and traditional women but the diﬀerence is not as important
as in Israel. The diﬀerences are also not signiﬁcant but important to
mention anyway. Religious women have an average of one more child than
non-religious women. Also, non-religious women in the West Bank have
a higher mean number of CEB than traditional women in Israel. As for
marriage, women follow a similar pattern in both regions. Women married
for over 10 years have a little more than twice as many children as women
who are not married or married for less than a year and about one more
child than women married for two to 10 years. The diﬀerence of the mean
number of CEB for the education, work status and income variables is
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not signiﬁcant in the West Bank 1. However, the results show that women
with a university degree have slightly more children than women with a
post secondary diploma and almost as many as women with a secondary
education or less. The relationship seems curvilinear in both regions. It
also shows that women who are not currently working at a job or business
have more children than women who do. Finally, women with a higher
monthly familiy income have more children.
4.2. Explanatory analysis
This section contains the results of the explanatory analyses done with
a Poisson regression model. For each regression, 3 models have been
designed:
(a) The ﬁrst model includes the religious variable and demographic char-
acteristics as the control variables;
(b) The second model includes the socioeconomic variables and demo-
graphic characteristics as the control variables;
(c) The third model includes both religious and socioeconomic variables
and demographic characteristics as the control variables.
These models were designed so that it is possible to measure the impact of
each category of variables independently and then measure their combined
impact. The ﬁrst regression has been made with the complete sample that
contains the information on the Jewish women of both Israel and the West
Bank. This regression was made to evaluate the impact of the region of
residence on the fertility of each group. To do that, an extra model was
tested that only includes the variable on region of residence and does not
have any control variables. The next two regressions have been conducted
for Jewish women of Israel and the West Bank separately to evaluate the
role of each independent variable on the fertility.
1The fact that there are only 90 observations in the West Bank gives a lot less statistical
power to the tests produced
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The coeﬃcients that are presented in the next three tables are incidence
rate ratios (IRR). An incidence rate is the measure of the frequency with
which an event occurs. It is obtained by exponentiating the poisson re-
gression coeﬃcient. For example, in table 4.2 the coeﬃcient obtained for
the region of residence from the Poisson regression in the ﬁrst model is
0.4151406. The IRR is : e0.4151406 = 1.52.
4.2.1. Israel and the West Bank
Table 4.2. Poisson regression of CEB for religious, socioeconomic
and demographic variables for all Jewish women living in Israel and
the West Bank
Characteristics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Religious variable
Religiosity (ref. = Non religious) Traditional 1.24*** 1.17***
Religious 1.91*** 1.81***
Socioeconomic variables
Monthly family income (ref. = 10,000 NIS or less) 10,001 NIS or more 0.84*** 0.95
Education (ref. = Secondary or less) Post secondary 0.87*** 0.88***
University degree 0.79*** 0.82***
Work status (ref. = Is currently working) Is not currently working 1.06 1.00
Demographic variables
Country of birth (ref. = Israel) Abroad 0.96 0.93* 0.97
Age (continuous) 1.22*** 1.21*** 1.22***
Years married (ref. = Not married or less than a year) 2.58*** 2.94*** 2.65***
11 years or more 3.04*** 3.49*** 3.08***
Region of residence (ref. = Israel) West Bank 1.52*** 1.10 1.32*** 1.13*
N 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p<0.001
Source: Our calculations from the General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
Table 4.2 presents the Poisson regression results analysing the combined
dataset with all female respondents from Israel and the West Bank. When
looking at Model 1 that only controls for the region of residence, it ap-
pears clear and strongly signiﬁcant that women residing in the West Bank
see their expected number of children increased. Indeed, these women have
a 52% higher expected number of children when no control is made for
religious, socioeconomic or demographic background. When only looking
at religiosity in Model 2, it shows that it strongly increases the expected
number of CEB. Traditional and religious women have respectively 24%
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and 91% more CEB than secular women. It also shows that age and du-
ration of the marriage are strongly signiﬁcant and have a very important
impact on the expected number of CEB. When considering religiosity in
this model, the region of residence is no longer a signiﬁcant variable in the
explanation of fertility. This might show that religiosity and the region of
residence are closely related. As mentioned earlier, most of the religious
people live in the West Bank. In Model 3, when considering the socioe-
conomic variables, the region of residence is back to being signiﬁcant but
a little less strong. All socioeconomic variables signiﬁcantly decrease the
expected number of CEB but the work status. Indeed, they lower the ex-
pected number of 15 to 20%. Regardless of religiosity, socioeconomic and
demographic conditions in Model 4, the fact of being a Jewish woman
living in the West Bank multiplies the number of expected children by a
factor of 1.13 which means that their expected number of children is 13%
higher than that of their counterparts living in all other regions of Israel.
It is of lesser importance than in the previous models but still signiﬁcant.
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4.2.2. Israel only
Table 4.3. Poisson regression of CEB for religious, socioeconomic
and demographic variables for all Jewish women living in Israel
Characteristics Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Religious variable
Religiosity (ref. = Non religious) Traditional 1.23*** 1.17***
Religious 1.93*** 1.82***
Socioeconomic variables
Monthly family income (ref. = 10,000 NIS or less) 10,001 NIS or more 0.84*** 0.94
Education (ref. = Secondary or less) Post secondary 0.88*** 0.88**
University degree 0.79*** 0.82***
Work status (ref. = Is currently working) Is not currently working 1.06 1.00
Demographic variables
Country of birth (ref. = Israel) Abroad 0.96 0.92* 0.97
Age (continuous) 1.23*** 1.21*** 1.22***
Years married (ref. = Not married or less than a year) 2-10 years 2.64*** 3.01*** 2.72***
11 years or more 3.05*** 3.54*** 3.10***
N 2,099 2,099 2,099
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p<0.001
Source: Our calculations from the General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
Looking at the results of the Poisson regression for all women living in
Israel in table 4.3 shows that the results are fairly similar to those of ta-
ble 4.2. This is due to the fact that most of the observations of the full
sample are from Israel. There are only 90 observations in the West Bank.
When looking at religiosity with a control for demographic variables in
Model 5, the results show that being traditional or religious multiplies
the expected number of CEB by a factor of 1.23 and 1.93; that is, they have
a number of CEB that is 23% and 93% higher as compared to non-religious
women, all other things being equal. when there is no control for religios-
ity in Model 6, being educated and having a high family income are two
socioeconomic factors that signiﬁcantly decrease the expected number of
CEB. It decreases by 16% when the gross monthly family income is over
10,001 NIS and by 12% and 21% when a woman has more than a sec-
ondary school diploma. The work status doesn’t have a signiﬁcant impact
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on the expected number of CEB. Only in this model, the country of origin
is lightly signiﬁcant and has a negative impact on the expected number
of CEB. Not being born in Israel decreases the expected number of CEB
by 8%. The demographic variables also have a rather considerable impact
on fertility. When controlling for all other variables in Model 7, the ex-
pected number of CEB increases by 172% and 210% when a woman has
been married for two to 10 years and 11 years or more. The importance
of religiosity and socioeconomic factors are slightly diminished but remain
important and signiﬁcant factors but the monthly family income becomes
insigniﬁcant. Indeed, from Model 6 to model 7, the monthly family income
loses all of its signiﬁcance. This might be due to the fact that there exist
a relationship between the income and religiosity. One would assume that
as religiosity increases, the income decreases because more time is dedi-
cated to religious studies instead of paid work. A woman employed at a
job or business doesn’t signiﬁcantly reduce the expected number of CEB
in Israel. Also, religiosity clearly has a more important impact on the
expected number of CEB. Nevertheless, education is the socioeconomic
factor that has the biggest impact on fertility by reducing the expected
number of CEB by 12% and 18% as education increases.
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4.2.3. West Bank only
Table 4.4. Poisson regression of CEB for religious, socioeconomic
and demographic variables for all Jewish women living in the West
Bank
Characteristics Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Religious variable
Religiosity (ref. = Non religious) Traditional 1.45 1.44
Religious 1.74*** 1.82***
Socioeconomic variables
Monthly family income (ref. = 10,000 NIS or less) 10,001 NIS or more 0.81 1.00
Education (ref. = Secondary or less) Post secondary 0.82 0.73
University degree 0.84*** 0.67
Work status (ref. = Is currently working) Is not currently working 1.07 0.99
Demographic variables
Country of birth (ref. = Israel) Abroad 0.97 0.98 1.03
Age (continuous) 1.16*** 1.19*** 1.19***
Years married (ref. = Not married or less than a year) 2-10 years 1.47 1.61 1.50
11 years or more 2.30*** 2.19*** 2.20***
N 90 90 90
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p<0.001
Source: Our calculations from the General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
Table 4.4 presents the results of the Poisson regression for the women liv-
ing in the West Bank. There are fewer signiﬁcant results because there
are only 90 observations. Such a number of observations decreases the
statistical power2 of the regression. It is however possible to observe a
trend and derive some interesting results.
As in the case of Israel, the fertility of Jewish women in the West Bank is
strongly inﬂuenced by religiosity. Even though the results for traditional
women are not signiﬁcant in any model, these women seem to have a num-
ber of CEB that is 45% higher than non religious women in Model 8 when
there is only control for demographic variables. The diﬀerence between
2The power of a statistical test is the probability that the test will reject a false or null
hypothesis.
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non-religious and religious women is even more important and signiﬁcant.
Being religious increases the expected number of CEB by 74%. In Model
9, the only socioeconomic variable that has a signiﬁcant impact on the ex-
pected number of children is education and its eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant.
A woman with a university degree will see her expected number of CEB
multiplied by a factor of 0.84 (when controlling for demographic variables)
which means that she is expected to have 16% less children than a woman
who has a secondary school diploma or less. Even though the result is
not signiﬁcant for women with a post secondary non-academic dimploma,
their expected number of CEB is decreased by 18%. Besides the fact that
the other two socioeconomic variables did not turn out to be signiﬁcant,
the work status has a very limited positive impact on the expected num-
ber of children just as in the other two regressions and a higher monthly
family income reduces the expected number of CEB by 19%, which is a
little more than the 16% observed in Israel. When considering religiosity
and socioeconomic conditions in Model 10, the role of some demographic
variables in the explanation of fertility is highlighted and goes in the same
direction as in the previous two models. They are of slightly lesser im-
portance than in Israel but the impact is similar. The expected number
of children increases by 19% every year and being married for 11 years or
more increases the expected number of CEB by 120%. Unlike in Israel, the
country of birth has a very light positive impact on the expected number
of CEB in the West Bank but is not signiﬁcant either. Contrary to the
other regressions, in the case of the West Bank, being religious increases
the expected number of CEB more when controlling for all variables than
when only controlling for demographic variables. Indeed, religious women
increase their expected number of 82% when controlling for all variables
compared to 74% when only controlling for demographic variables.
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4.3. Summary of results
In table 3.3 at the end of the previous chapter, I have found some relevant
information about the background characteristics of the respondents of
Israel and the West Bank. It shows that the age distribution of women is
equivalent in both regions. As mentioned in the previous section and in
the table, most of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of
the respondents in both regions are distributed in similar ways. Indeed
about 30% of women have a university degree and 50% have a post sec-
ondary non-academic diploma. 65% of them are working and almost 70%
live on a monthly familiy income under 10,000 NIS. Finally, about three
quarters of the women were born in Israel. There are diﬀerences in the
length of the unions. Almost 40% of israeli women are not married or got
married in the past year as opposed to 15% in the West Bank. Half of the
women in the West Bank have been married for over 10 years. It comes
down to a little under 40% in Israel. The most important diﬀerences are
seen in their religiosity. Women in the West Bank are much more religious
than their counterparts in Israel. Almost half of the respondents in Israel
declared being non-religious as opposed to only one quarter in the West
Bank. 55% of the women in the West Bank declared being religious and
only 15% in Israel.
Despite such similar background socioeconomic and demographic char-
acteristics considerable diﬀerences in the mean number of CEB remain.
As women age, their mean number of CEB increases but on a much shorter
period among Israeli women because they start having children later than
women in the West Bank. Table 4.1 also allows us to see that diﬀerence
in the mean number of CEB between religious and non-religious women is
much more important in Israel than in the West Bank. Religious women
in Israel have more than twice as many children than non-religious women
compared to only 1.3 times more children in the West Bank. No matter the
region of residence, religious women have about the same mean number
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of CEB (3.07 in Israel and 3.18 in the West Bank). There is a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the mean number of CEB of native born and immigrants in
Israel. Immigrants have a slightly higher mean number of children. The
relationship goes in the same direction in the West Bank but is not sig-
niﬁcant. Women married for 11 years or more obviously have a lot more
children than women that are not married or married for less than a year
and that, in both regions.
The Poisson regressions in the second part of the chapter were produced to
shed the light on the factors that have the greatest impact on the fertility
of Jewish women in the two regions. The results show that even though
people are proportionally a lot more religious in the West Bank religiosity
has a bigger impact on fertility in Israel than in the West Bank. The small
minority of religious people living in Israel are known to be very orthodox
and their fertility is very high compared to the rest of the Israeli popu-
lation. Being religious as opposed to non-religious increases the expected
number of CEB by 93% in Israel and by 74% in the West Bank. Education
comes out as the socioeconomic variable with the greatest impact on fer-
tility in both regions. Indeed, the monthly family income has a marginal
impact in both regions and is not signiﬁcant. The impact of the work
status is also not signiﬁcant in any of the regions and has no impact when
controlling for all other variables. Education however signiﬁcantly reduces
the expected number of CEB in both regions but its impact is stronger in
the West Bank for women with a post secondary non-academic diploma3;
it decreases of 18% as opposed to 12% in the rest of the country. Having
a university dimploma decreases the expected number of CEB by 21% in
Israel and 16% in the West Bank. Most demographic variables impact
fertility in a similar matter in both regions. Still, it has been noted that
3As seen in table 3.3 a post secondary non-academic diploma is the most common diploma
attained in both regions.
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the duration of the marital union has a greater impact on fertility in Is-
rael. This might be due to the fact that marriage is not as automatic
in Israel compared to the West Bank considering that more people are
religious in the WestBank. Indeed, women who have been married for 11
years or more in Israel see their expected number of CEB increased of
210% compared to women who are not married or married for a year. In
the West Bank, the impact is of 120%.
In sum, the most important variables in the explanation of the high Jewish
fertility in Israel and the West Bank are as expected religiosity, education
and marital status. It was however not expected that they would im-
pact on the regions the way they do. Because the West Bank is home to
many religious people, it was expected that religiosity would have a much
bigger impact in the West Bank than in Israel. Also, given the religious
nature of its population, it wasn’t expected that education would have
such an important role in decreasing the mean number of CEB in the
West Bank. This study allowed to clarify some of the preconceptions on
the mechanisms that regulate fertility in Israel. However, having access
to a survey with a limited amount of information about the behaviours
of Jewish Israelis, does not allow a thorough understanding of the phe-
nomenon. There must be other factors that inﬂuence fertility that are not
possible to capture and measure in this study.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The data of the 2004 General Social Survey made available by the Central
Bureau of Statistics of Israel allowed us to study a very small population;
the Jewish population in the West Bank that represented 4% of the total
population of Israel in 2008 (Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, 2010).
Comparing such a small population group with the rest of the popula-
tion causes many diﬃculties on a methodological level. Consequently, the
types of analyses were very limited. Nevertheless, the data allowed us to
produce some statistical analyses that helped answering the initial ques-
tions of research.
The ﬁrst objective of this project was to conﬁrm that the fertility of the
Jewish women living in Israel was indeed signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
fertility of Jewish women living in the West Bank. With the data and
with the appropriate statistical test, I have been able to conﬁrm that the
diﬀerence of 1.88 mean number of CEB in Israel was signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent from the 2.84 mean number of CEB in the West Bank. With the ﬁrst
Poisson regression in table 4.2 I have been able to conﬁrm that the fact
of living in the West Bank rather than in Israel increases the expected
number of CEB by 13%. Once this is established, I have been able to
pursue the analyses.
The descriptive analysis has allowed to evaluate in what ways the fer-
tility levels were diﬀerent in the two regions. In table 3.3 I was able to
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see that the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the respon-
dents were roughly similar in the two regions. Later on, table 4.1 shows
that there are also many similarities in the way Jewish women of Israel
and the West Bank experience fertility. Despite the fact that for most
variables used, the women of the West Bank had a higher mean number
of CEB than those of Israel, the patterns were in most cases the same.
When a woman has access to higher levels of education, has a job, a high
family income, is secular or is born in Israel, the least children she will
tend to have and vice-versa. In spite of these similar trends, some diﬀer-
ences in their behavior remain. I have seen that Israeli women seem to
start having children later than women in the West Bank and have fewer
children in the end. The most striking diﬀerence is related to religiosity.
I have discovered that religious women have the same mean number of
CEB in the two regions but there are a lot less religious people in Israel.
Also, non religious women have a much greater mean number of CEB in
the West Bank compared to that of their counterparts in Israel (2.38 vs.
1.42). This means that religiosity alone cannot explain the fertility diﬀer-
ences in the two regions even though it is the variable with the greatest
impact. In sum, the fertility behaviors don’t really diﬀer from one region
to the other; they more or less follow the same patterns. The religious,
socioeconomic and demographic variables used in the study inﬂuence the
fertility of all Jewish women in the same direction. The diﬀerence resides
more in the intensity with which the variables aﬀect fertility.
Even though most variables seem to aﬀect fertility downward or upward in
the same way for all women, it cannot be denied that some variables have
a greater impact on the fertility of women in some regions that others.
As expected the results from the Poisson regressions show that religios-
ity has a strong impact on fertility which echoes other studies made on
the subject. Zhang (2008) brings out the fact that the positive eﬀect of
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religious beliefs on fertility must have something to do with the role of re-
ligion in guiding the human behaviour in terms of sexuality, cohabitation,
marriage and family. However religiosity seems to have a greater impact
on fertility in Israel than in the West Bank (1.93 vs. 1.74). Given the
fact that there are much more religious people in the West Bank, it would
have been expected that religiosity impacts more there. It has also been
noted that education in the most common education group has a bigger
impact in decreasing the expected number of CEB in the West Bank than
in Israel. Not working at a job or business doesn’t have a signiﬁcant im-
pact in Israel or the West Bank. Having a higher monthly family income
doesn’t signiﬁcantly impact on fertility either but it seems to slightly in-
crease the expected number of CEB in Israel. The country of origin has
a very small negative impact on fertility on a national level and in Israel
only. Israeli women born abroad have a number of CEB 3% lower than
natives. The situation is opposite in the West Bank; it increases fertility
by about 3%. Looking back at Anson and Meir (1996) statement that
immigrant women in Israel are over-reproducing, this ﬁnding shows that
they still don’t have enough children to reach the level of fertility of na-
tive Israeli women but it is not the case in the West Bank. They have
more children than the natives. Finally, the results show that marriage
has a bigger impact on fertility in Israel than in the West Bank. Given
the fact that the respondents in the West Bank were way more religious
than those in Israel, fertility outside marriage must be pretty rare so for
that matter, marriage has a lesser impact on fertility than in a community
where religion takes less place such as Israel.
To sum up, the data allowed to successfully attain my objectives of re-
search. I can conclude that Israel and the West Bank are essentially in-
ﬂuenced by the same religious, socioeconomic and demographic variables
that is mainly: religiosity, education, age and marital status. The impact
of these variables on fertility is the same for the women in the two regions
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studied but the impact varies in intensity. Indeed, religiosity, age and
marital status have a stronger impact on fertility in Israel but the impact
of education on fertility is greater in the West Bank.
When looking back at religious theories of fertility diﬀerentials, it is now
clear that some hypothseses work better in the context of this study than
others. The minority group status hypothesis seems to be the most appro-
priate when considering the historical and political context of the country.
The legitimacy of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank is disputed by
the International Community and Israel is devoting great eﬀort to justify
their presence. For that matter it seems as if their minority status is the
cause of many insecurities and they may be maintaining high fertility to
ensure their presence in the future on the territory. To pursue this analy-
sis further, it would be necessary to collect data on the Palestinian Arabs
living in the West Bank. That way, their fertility could be compared and
give a broader analysis of the fertility behavior of the Jewish population of
the West Bank. This hypothesis could even be used in a broader context
to explain the generally high fertility of the Jewish population of Israel on
a national level. The Jewish population could be considered a minority
group relative to the neighbouring Arab countries.
Even though I have been able to highlight the impact of a certain number
of variables on the fertility of Jewish women living in Israel and the West
Bank, it is clear that the data available didn’t allow to measure the whole
phenomenon. Indeed, if both groups have a similar socioeconomic and de-
mographic background and are inﬂuenced by the same variables and the
results show that religiosity itself is not enough to explain the diﬀerences,
we must look elsewhere for further answers. The series of questions asked
in the General Social Survey of Israel in 2004 were of a very general order
and limited the amount of variables that could be used. For that mat-
ter, there must be other factors that cause such a substantial gap in the
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fertility of the two regions. Anson and Meir (1996) added an interesting
variable in the puzzle in order to make a more holistic analysis: national-
ism. They tried to explain the high fertility of Israel as a whole compared
to its European counterparts. In this article, they argue that:
“(...) Israel’s high fertility needs to be explained not in terms
of the internal qualities of particular parts of the popula-
tion, but rather in terms of Israel’s special position in the
Middle East and in the world-economy as a whole, and the
nationalist sentiment which this engenders in the conscience
collective (the set of symbols, meanings and ideas which are
more or less common to all members of society).”
To support their assumptions they used census data and voting returns for
Jewish urban statistical areas in the early 1980’s to provide the evidence
that high fertility is directly associated with nationalism. They noted that
women living in religious areas had on average 21.5% more children in the
ﬁve years prior to the census than did women in non-religious areas. They
also noted that the eﬀect of nationalism is far greater than that of reli-
gion and that women in nationalist areas had 35% more children than did
women in conciliatory areas. The conclusion of their article states that
much of the religiosity recorded in fertility surveys is an expression of a
strongly felt nationalist sentiment.
Perhaps to key to explaining the part of the fertility of Jewish women in
Israel and the West Bank that we cannot perceive resides in the expression
of their nationalist feelings. Anson and Meir (1996) use this argument to
compare Israel with other countries but it may be even more relevant in-
side Israel’s boundaries because there are such fertility diﬀerences within
the diﬀerent regions of the country. As mentioned earlier, the West Bank
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is a disputed territory and the Israeli government is putting a lot of ef-
forts to encourage its population to live there. One could hypothesize
that the individuals who choose to live there have some strong nationalist
sentiments and want to have a greater number of children to ensure their
perenniality in the territory. This hypothesis could be supported by some
results in this thesis that show that immigrants that arrive in Israel have a
lower number of CEB than natives but immigrants that arrive in the West
Bank have a higher humber of CEB than natives. Others could argue that
since there are such great incentives for people to move to the West Bank,
those who chose to live there are the ones with lower incomes who want to
improve their living conditions. These people with lower living conditions
tend to have more children than highly educated people with high paying
jobs as shown in this thesis.
One thing is for sure, to prove any of these hypotheses, a comprehensive
survey on the Jewish people living in the West Bank has to be conducted.
It would require questions about their political views, the frequency of re-
ligious service attendance and their children. The small amount of people
living in the West Bank recorded in the 2004 GSS resulted in a lack of
statistical power in the analysis of their results compared to that of those
living in Israel. A bigger survey would allow researchers to have more
ﬂexibility in their choice of methods and variables that would allow better
results and a better understanding of the high fertility of Jewish women
living in the West Bank.
Appendix A
Table A.1. Distribution of the independant variables before and
after categorization
Independant variables Before After
Categories Israel West Bank Categories Israel West Bank
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Religiosity Ultra-Orthodox 9.58 26.67 Religious 16.82 54.44
Religious 7.24 27.78 Traditional 36.59 18.89
Traditional but religious 10.34 7.78 Not religious 46.59 26.67
Traditional but not so religious 26.25 11.11
Non religious, secular 46.59 26.67
Education Elementary or middle school 2.19 1.11 Secondary or less 22.96 17.78
Secondary school 19.77 13.33 Post-secondary 48.17 51.11
Baccalaureate certiﬁcate 27.35 22.22 University degree 28.87 31.11
Post-secondary, non academic 20.82 28.89
BA, academic certiﬁcate 20.34 15.56
MA, MD or similar certiﬁcate 7.91 15.56
PhD or similar certiﬁcate 0.62 0
Work status Working 65.03 64.44 Working 65.03 64.44
Not working 34.97 35.56 Not working 34.97 35.56
Monthly family income NIS 2,500 or less 5.86 7.78 NIS 10,000 or less 67.89 67.78
NIS 2,501 - 4,000 7.91 10 NIS 10,001 or more 32.11 32.22
NIS 4,001 - 5,000 6.67 7.78
NIS 5,001 - 6,500 8.19 7.78
NIS 6,501 - 8,000 9.72 14.44
NIS 8,001 - 10,000 11.86 15.56
NIS 10,001 - 13,000 11.39 11.11
NIS 13,001 - 17,000 8.77 11.11
NIS 17,001 - 24,000 6.86 6.67
More than NIS 24,001 5.10 3.33
Not declared 17.68 4.44
Country of birth Israel 72.61 75.56 Israel 72.61 75.56
Europe-America 21.06 20 Abroad 27.39 24.44
Asia 1.72 1.11
Africa 4.62 3.33
Years married Not married 36.87 13.33 Single or in the last year 37.92 15.56
Last year 1.05 2.22 2 - 10 yeas 23.63 34.44
2 - 5 years 12.01 15.56 11 + years 38.45 50
6 - 10 years 11.62 18.89
11 + years 38.45 50
Source: General Social Survey of Israel, 2004
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